31 – Turning Point – from Germany’s Reactive Zeitenwende to Proactive Strategic Change in Europe?

00:00:00: Welcome to Berlin Side Out, the podcast that takes an expert look at how Germany sees the

00:00:05: world and the world sees Germany.

00:00:07: With me, Benjamin Tallis.

00:00:09: And me, Aaron Gash-Bernett.

00:00:11: Hello, and welcome back to Berlin Side Out, the Foreign Affairs podcast in association

00:00:20: with the German Council on Foreign Relations that takes an expert look at international

00:00:24: politics from Berlin.

00:00:26: I'm Aaron Gash-Bernett, a journalist and security analyst specializing in German politics and

00:00:30: foreign policy.

00:00:31: And I'm here with my friend and co-host, Benjamin Tallis, Senior Research Fellow here at the

00:00:37: Council and head of its Action Group, Seitanwende.

00:00:40: Now, Ben, we're recording this today, our second season finale of Berlin Side Out on

00:00:44: the sidelines of the Leonard Mary Conference in Tallinn.

00:00:47: In plenty of the conversations we've had here speak to the need for a new turning point

00:00:51: in how we defend our democracies and ensure our prosperity.

00:00:55: We've been hearing here, particularly from Estonian hosts, but also from others.

00:00:59: And we agree that the road to doing that runs through Ukraine, specifically through Ukrainian

00:01:03: victory.

00:01:05: And I've noticed here in Tallinn calls for us to break the cycle of pessimism.

00:01:09: And Prime Minister Kaya Kallis put it thus, we need to understand the situation is serious,

00:01:14: but excessive pessimism can lead us into thinking that acting is pointless.

00:01:19: So let's take bold steps to help Ukraine win and break that cycle.

00:01:23: Let's up our military support and industrial capacity.

00:01:26: Let's seize Russia's central bank assets.

00:01:28: Let's give Ukraine a credible path to NATO.

00:01:30: And I'm very happy to say, listeners, that we were at a media briefing with Prime Minister

00:01:35: Kaya Kallis, and we will be hearing excerpts of what she told international media, including

00:01:40: us at the briefing later on in the show.

00:01:44: But Ben, in contrast to the "We'll find a way or make one" approach that we see in

00:01:49: Tallinn, in other capitals.

00:01:52: In Germany, we often hear about why we just don't, we can't do any of these things, often

00:01:57: for reasons that frankly just don't stack up.

00:02:00: And that seems a far cry from Chancellor Olaf Scholz's "Sit and Vendor" speech two years

00:02:04: ago, in which he promised a new era in German and foreign and security policy.

00:02:09: So have we really had a "Sit and Vendor" and is that term still useful?

00:02:14: No and no.

00:02:15: On the substance, I stand by the assessment that we made at the end of last year, based

00:02:19: on the work of the Action Group "Sit and Vendor", that the change, Germany's sea change or turning

00:02:24: point as trailed by Olaf Scholz in that speech is not only seriously incomplete on its own

00:02:29: terms, but it's dangerously inadequate to meet the challenges that we actually face

00:02:33: and seize the opportunities that we'll need to in order to not despair but actually act

00:02:37: as is the theme of this conference here.

00:02:40: In terms of the speed of change, the level of ambition of that change and how internationally

00:02:44: coordinated it's been and the coherence it has across policy sectors, it hasn't met

00:02:48: the requirements.

00:02:51: The one exception I would say is the sustainability of the change that's been made, which is likely

00:02:56: to stick, but that's also because it hasn't gone very far, to be quite honest.

00:02:59: Even though in some areas such as relations to Russia, I'm not sure the current position

00:03:02: will actually be sustained in a, if there's a geopolitical shift again.

00:03:06: That assessment also goes for the five major fields that were covered in the speech, support

00:03:10: for Ukraine as the first, building Germany's defence capabilities, second, third, the approach

00:03:14: to authoritarian states, fourth, Germany's contribution to and positioning in key institutions,

00:03:19: EU and NATO especially, and fifth, and lastly, its energy mix.

00:03:23: While Germany has got off Russian gas, and it did so fast, partly because Russia turned

00:03:27: off the tab, it hasn't yet found an energy mix that answers geopolitical as well as

00:03:31: ecological and economic considerations that is sustainable in the long run.

00:03:35: This is where a shift to the positive, the Titan vendor has succeeded in opening up the

00:03:39: space of discussion in which geopolitical considerations, security considerations in

00:03:44: fields of energy and economy as well as others can actually be discussed.

00:03:48: However, going with the latest research we've been doing, including virus series of focus

00:03:52: groups that we commissioned around Germany, and which was just presented to the Action

00:03:56: Group Titan vendor this week, I think the term has now outlived its usefulness because it

00:04:00: seemed by experts and the general public alike as empty, and has become something of a symbol

00:04:05: of inadequacy rather than of rising to meet the geopolitical moment that alone setting

00:04:09: the kind of strategy we need to face the future with confidence.

00:04:13: But that's in Germany.

00:04:14: Elsewhere, it has been different, and some didn't need to change so much in the first

00:04:18: place.

00:04:19: Others have recognized mistakes of the past and have changed position rhetorically at

00:04:23: least, even if questions remain about the material backup to that and how sustainable

00:04:27: that change will be.

00:04:28: And that's what we want to talk about with our guests today.

00:04:31: So to help us discuss both the German and European dimensions of this, including how

00:04:36: to bring about the strategic turning point, we need to see, we're joined by a fabulously

00:04:41: international panel, which we hope will help you understand the multiple perspectives in

00:04:45: play here.

00:04:46: So first up, welcome to Benjamin Haddad, a member of the French National Assembly and

00:04:51: self-described recovering think tanker, as I heard you say yesterday, having had quite

00:04:56: the career in security studies before heading into politics.

00:05:01: Welcome also to Ambassador Jonathan Seveov, the Secretary General of the Estonian Foreign

00:05:05: Affairs Ministry.

00:05:07: And finally, Dr. Sabina Fischer, senior fellow in the Research Division on Eastern Europe

00:05:12: and Eurasia at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

00:05:17: So we're going to give our hosts the privilege of going first.

00:05:22: Jonathan, we're talking about how the security debate has changed or needs to change in Europe

00:05:26: or parts of Europe, but Estonia hasn't had the same turning point, partly because it

00:05:30: warned about Russian intentions, the weaponization of Nord Stream 2, and it ended up being right.

00:05:38: How does it feel to have been proven right?

00:05:40: And what are the changes Germany and others need to make to catch up?

00:05:44: But also, we must also ask this, what changes do you think Estonia might also need to make?

00:05:50: So first of all, thank you for having me and thank you for the kind words.

00:05:54: It's great to be here in Tallinn at the Linn-Otmeri Conference.

00:05:57: I think the conference year after year becomes more and more relevant.

00:06:02: You know, I think it doesn't feel particularly great to have been right.

00:06:08: We always knew we were right.

00:06:09: I'm sure our opponents back in the day in those debates also thought they were right.

00:06:15: And then when they realized they weren't, they did the gracious thing of saying that

00:06:19: they were mistaken and changed course.

00:06:22: That's not relevant today because we're in the middle of a war that will shape Europe's

00:06:29: history, Europe's future, certainly Estonia's security.

00:06:34: And instead of focusing on who was right, who was wrong a year ago or 10 years ago, we

00:06:39: should be focusing on the future.

00:06:41: What it is that we're trying to get out of this, how do we define victory, which shouldn't

00:06:46: really be a controversial issue and hasn't been for Estonia.

00:06:50: We've said it publicly, officially.

00:06:52: We define victory as an outcome that safeguards territorial integrity and sovereignty as cornerstones

00:06:58: of European security.

00:07:00: And that obviously also includes territorial integrity and sovereignty for Ukraine.

00:07:04: Our definition of victory includes the notion that aggression as a tool of statecraft should

00:07:08: be discredited, meaning that the aggressor should not find himself in a better position

00:07:13: strategically or politically or economically than he was when he decided to commit aggression.

00:07:19: That relates to this notion of accountability, both with regard to war crimes and the crime

00:07:24: of aggression, but also to accountability in the sense of the damages that have been

00:07:30: caused in Ukraine and potential reparations or if not those, then the use of frozen assets

00:07:37: for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

00:07:40: And it includes the notion of Europe that security architecture remains standing on

00:07:48: the two feet it's been standing on that's NATO and the European Union with those that

00:07:53: are willing and able as part of those organizations.

00:07:57: And that obviously includes Ukraine and Boltova and others with the caveat of them meeting

00:08:03: the necessary requirements.

00:08:06: These are merit-based organizations.

00:08:08: But we should be very, very open and clear about the fact that war instability, chaos

00:08:15: in post-Cold War Europe has always stemmed from those so-called gray areas.

00:08:21: And if we leave a gray area in the middle of the geostrategic center of Europe, then

00:08:27: we'll have nothing but war, chaos and instability in the future.

00:08:31: So that's what we're focused on, talking about it openly, pushing for others to do more,

00:08:38: pushing ourselves to do more.

00:08:40: The only metric that matters is not whether we were right yesterday, whether we are right

00:08:44: today.

00:08:45: The only metric that matters is whether we win or whether we lose.

00:08:49: And we won't know until it happens.

00:08:52: Now, I don't want to go on for too long, but I'll just say one more thing.

00:08:56: We're democracies.

00:08:57: We're very good at creating narratives, talking about stuff.

00:09:01: So it's only natural that when we win wars, we celebrate them with concrete dates in mind.

00:09:09: When we lose wars, we tend to do a very good job at explaining the loss away.

00:09:15: Sooner or later, the defeat becomes evident.

00:09:17: We lost the war in Afghanistan.

00:09:19: Taliban is back.

00:09:20: We lost it.

00:09:21: But when did we lose it?

00:09:23: My point being here, that our defeats, unless they're total defeats, which are unlikely at

00:09:29: this stage, our defeats usually come under other banners.

00:09:33: They come under the banner of peace or of strategic stability.

00:09:39: That's why we're advocating for very clear language when it comes to what we're trying

00:09:42: to get out of this current war.

00:09:45: We're somewhat concerned that others find it difficult to use similarly clear language

00:09:52: because it obviously raises all sorts of logical questions as to why there are certainly no

00:09:57: intellectual gaps or holdbacks.

00:10:00: And final thing I want to say before handing it over to colleagues on Germany.

00:10:08: I can sense how the criticism that comes from this part of Europe towards Germany, how we

00:10:16: can irritate our German friends for good reasons, who likes to be criticized.

00:10:23: And I'm not saying this as a government official, but just as an observer.

00:10:27: When you look at the criticism coming from Polish think tanks or Lithuania or Latvia

00:10:33: or Estonia, look at the essence of the criticism.

00:10:36: It is those countries, those societies demanding for more Germany, more German military might,

00:10:42: more German economic presence, more Germany.

00:10:46: And I know it can be irritating, but if you take a few steps back and look at the context,

00:10:50: look at who's talking and consider their history, there cannot be a greater compliment to Germany's

00:10:58: democracy and trustworthiness that you have Poland demanding for more Germany or Lithuania

00:11:05: demanding for more Germany.

00:11:07: So I hope that our German friends, even when they disagree, see this as the most significant

00:11:14: of compliments that Germany could get from countries that frankly, 67, 80 years ago,

00:11:21: were in a, how to put it mildly, a fundamentally different position.

00:11:25: That's right.

00:11:26: And that's been a consistent theme of Berlin's side out.

00:11:27: We want the best Germany we can get.

00:11:29: And part of that involves identifying the problems.

00:11:32: Problems need to be made, but also creating solutions.

00:11:35: Now, Benjamin, over to you.

00:11:38: It's been said that there has been a French site and vendor, the Bratislava agenda, as

00:11:42: it's been laid out.

00:11:43: Could you talk us through the reasons behind that, what it constitutes and also how sustainable

00:11:47: it is?

00:11:48: Because there have also been criticisms that it's a lot of talk, not backed up by rhetoric.

00:11:51: So how do you see France's change?

00:11:53: Let me pick up on one point that John Lynch has made because I think it's really critical.

00:12:00: Your question is does the European site and vendor real?

00:12:04: And of course, the jury is still out because it will depend on whether we win this war or

00:12:08: not.

00:12:09: Vladimir Putin's first hope was to take over key very quickly in a couple of weeks that

00:12:12: Ukraine would fall apart and that of course allies wouldn't react.

00:12:16: And what we've seen so far is that allies have stayed united, that Europeans have dramatically

00:12:21: increased their defense spending in Germany and France elsewhere, sent weapons to Ukraine

00:12:27: and that we're still focused and we're still, we're still discussing.

00:12:30: Today, how to increase both the quantity but also the nature of our military support for

00:12:34: Ukraine.

00:12:36: But of course, Putin's gambit and this is why I was troubled a few months into the war

00:12:41: when I started seeing France that I think we're doing this for the right reasons but

00:12:46: started writing that Putin had already lost because he'd lost Ukraine strategically because

00:12:50: Sweden and Finland were about to join NATO because we were united because NATO had found

00:12:55: a purpose again.

00:12:56: And as much as I appreciated the optimism, this is a long game.

00:13:01: Unfortunately, there's no quick fix to this and the biggest test is whether we're able

00:13:07: to sustain our support and sustain our own effort to arm ourselves at the same time.

00:13:12: And this is where we're going to be tested.

00:13:14: We'll discuss this in more detail.

00:13:15: Let me talk about the French Zeit-Vendeur as I think the economist has called it.

00:13:23: One thing hasn't changed is that since 2017 and I would say even before but clearly President

00:13:31: Macron more than his predecessors has put that as the center of his agenda, we're pushing

00:13:36: a vision that Europe could be wiped out of history, that Europe could become sort of

00:13:43: a passive theater of great power rivalry with no agency over its technological, military,

00:13:49: economic, energetic future and that it needs to take ownership of its own security and

00:13:55: be able to, without naivety, defend its own security interests, trade interests, protect

00:14:01: itself maybe from dangerous foreign investments, infrastructure and technology and so forth.

00:14:11: The test for our ability to promote this agenda is our support for Ukraine and is our ability

00:14:18: to integrate the security imperatives and the threats not only I would say of our partners

00:14:25: like Estonia, Poland and others but also to recognize the fact that Russia is targeting

00:14:29: us.

00:14:30: Not only is targeting the European security architecture and it's putting this as clearly

00:14:35: dismantling the security architecture is one of its key priorities but it's targeting

00:14:39: France directly.

00:14:42: Constant cyber attacks against our infrastructure, hospitals, key ministries, interference in

00:14:47: our democracy which started by the way, I mean at the very beginning of Macron's campaign

00:14:51: in 2017, the hacking of his emails, propaganda, going after our interests in Africa with Wagner

00:14:59: with propaganda operations and so recognizing that.

00:15:03: You mentioned the Bratislava speech.

00:15:05: I do think it was a historic speech for a couple reasons.

00:15:09: I mean, of course there was the tone recognizing at the beginning of the speech that alluding

00:15:14: to Jacques Chirac's famous sentence in 2003 that the new members in Central Europe had

00:15:23: lost an opportunity to shut up.

00:15:26: He said we wasted an opportunity to listen to you.

00:15:28: Now, if you allow me to maybe take a second on this comment, it's interesting because

00:15:33: when I started traveling to Warsaw for example on a regular basis, especially when I was

00:15:39: working in ThinkTanks, I would hear this reference all the time, the Chirac sentence.

00:15:43: And I would go back to France and tell them, you know, I mean they still care very much

00:15:47: about this and people tell me, oh yeah, but Chirac was right because he was right about

00:15:52: Iraq.

00:15:53: And it was interesting, I said, well, but that's not the point.

00:15:55: The point is you have countries that have after half a century of occupation were abandoned

00:16:03: behind the iron curtain that have recovered their sovereignty, their freedom 15 years ago

00:16:08: and now you're telling them to shut up.

00:16:10: And the point I'm trying to make is there was for a long time in Paris a lack of sensitivity,

00:16:17: historical empathy, geographical empathy towards the region.

00:16:21: And I would say just lack of curiosity, not enough engagement.

00:16:24: I would go to ThinkTanks events such as this one and I would very often be the only French

00:16:29: person and I was invited because I was part of an American organization.

00:16:32: And I think that has changed.

00:16:34: Now you see all across the region, parliamentarians, diplomats, ThinkTank experts trying to engage.

00:16:42: There is no agenda for European sovereignty or strictee cotonomy, however you want to

00:16:47: call it, I'm not.

00:16:48: I don't have any theological opinion about the terms without pushing back against Russian

00:16:54: aggression, without making the case to especially to this region, but to all of Europe that

00:16:59: Europe can protect themselves against Russian aggression.

00:17:02: That was I think the key point of the Breislaube speech.

00:17:05: Absolutely.

00:17:06: And just to remember that that comment came in the same year that there was a famous letter,

00:17:09: an open letter, Germany loves open letters as we know, but this was from Jürgen Habermas

00:17:14: and Jacques Dergidah that actually referred to a core Europe and a non-core Europe.

00:17:19: And that comment from Chirac played into exactly the idea that there was a hierarchy within

00:17:23: Europe despite the formal equality that we were going to see through NATO and EU membership.

00:17:27: There were still some true Europeans and those who were lucky to be there on tolerance from

00:17:30: the others.

00:17:31: And addressing that grievance has been so important in actually understanding what

00:17:35: that French site and vendor might be.

00:17:37: And so bringing Central and Eastern Europe into that perspective, and we'll come more

00:17:41: on to that later, but Sabina, we'd like to come over to you.

00:17:44: Reflecting on all of this, we've heard Ben just talk about this perception of old Europe

00:17:49: versus new Europe.

00:17:50: That has also been a perception that Germany has in to varying degrees also had or been

00:17:58: criticized for having.

00:18:00: How would you assess this from a German perspective and what is the need for further change within

00:18:06: Germany and do we need more?

00:18:10: As much as Germany is obviously listening more to North and Central and Eastern Europe,

00:18:16: I would also argue that there's more that could be done.

00:18:18: What would you say to this?

00:18:19: Yeah, I mean, I can start by saying that we definitely need more.

00:18:24: And I've been saying that also publicly in Germany for the past two years.

00:18:27: So I agree with the criticism of sort of the Titan vendor policy getting stuck on various

00:18:36: issues and aspects of it.

00:18:38: And that's a problem.

00:18:39: Nevertheless, I would actually like to stress that there have been changes, very, very profound

00:18:45: changes in the German perception of the whole region.

00:18:51: Really.

00:18:52: I mean, there is a lot of a lot more humbleness with regard to the positions.

00:18:57: And also the warnings that were given by Poland, by the Baltic states with regard to Russia's

00:19:03: imperialism, right?

00:19:05: And Russia's aggressive policies.

00:19:09: I think the German perception of not of Central Eastern Europe, so basically partners, the

00:19:17: partners in the European Union and NATO, but indeed of Eastern Europe has changed profoundly.

00:19:22: So I mean, and this is in a way really tragic because until February 2022, the mainstream,

00:19:32: let's say German perspective of Eastern Europe was very, very much focused on Russia.

00:19:38: So there was this Russia prism and the political community in Berlin looked at the other countries

00:19:45: in the region through this prism.

00:19:49: And it required the full scale invasion to finally, finally put Ukraine and Moldova and

00:19:58: Georgia and the other countries on the mental map in Germany.

00:20:02: And I think they are there to stay.

00:20:06: But this is, of course, something that I as a German have to say that this is, it's,

00:20:12: I mean, it started to change slowly after 2014.

00:20:17: So there was a process before the full, the beginning of the full scale invasion, but

00:20:21: of course it was, it was much too slow.

00:20:25: So this is where we are with regard to the criticism.

00:20:29: I mean, I think it's very important to have a nuanced and granulated picture of Germany's

00:20:35: policies and the politics behind them because we are in a difficult domestic situation.

00:20:42: I think the Titan vendor and the changes in the thinking that made the Titan vendor possible,

00:20:52: they're there to stay with regard to the Democratic parties.

00:20:56: And it's already said that I have to say this, the Democratic parties, because we have less

00:21:01: Democratic parties now on the political fringes of the political spectrum.

00:21:12: And here we have very different positions and also strategic visions with regard to

00:21:19: Russia, Ukraine, the whole region and the war.

00:21:23: And we have very important elections coming up.

00:21:26: And some of the Democratic parties are under very serious pressure.

00:21:30: So this is a tension that will impact on Germany's policies in the coming months and years.

00:21:38: And it worries me.

00:21:39: I wanted to make one point in reaction to what you said, Johnson, about narratives, because

00:21:45: I mean, I was a little bit surprised when you said that democracies are actually very

00:21:48: good at producing narratives because my impression also with regard to my own position within

00:21:56: the German discourse, for instance, but also when we look at the global debate specifically

00:22:03: about the war against Ukraine, but also then Gaza, etc.

00:22:07: is that we're really not good at narratives.

00:22:10: And that Russia is actually, I mean, I'm not saying it's already winning the war of

00:22:16: narratives, but we're moving in this direction.

00:22:19: And this is, I think, a really, it's a really great danger for Ukraine.

00:22:26: It's very existential, but also for our democracies.

00:22:30: Look, I guess I have to then jump back in and say that I don't necessarily disagree with

00:22:36: you.

00:22:37: The point I was trying to make is that democratic governments are in power because they have

00:22:42: been able to explain to their people what they're trying to do, create some sort of a

00:22:46: narrative.

00:22:47: And it's tested every few years, whether they can explain it away, whether they cannot.

00:22:51: There isn't much else that keeps a democratic government in power, but their ability to

00:22:55: create a narrative.

00:22:58: This is not necessarily the case in foreign policy.

00:23:03: But there the limitation isn't our ability.

00:23:06: It's our willingness.

00:23:08: And that's the reason why we should be concerned.

00:23:12: When we don't make sense, and I'm talking about we are not Estonian, or German, or any

00:23:16: particular country, this is a hypothetical.

00:23:19: If we don't make, if our narrative doesn't make sense in the wider world, if we're using

00:23:25: talking points that clearly are superficial or hollow, then the limitation usually is not

00:23:33: our ability.

00:23:35: It's something else.

00:23:36: And that we should openly call out, talk about.

00:23:41: Perhaps not openly, openly in the general public because everybody's domestic political

00:23:46: situation is difficult.

00:23:48: Every few years our American friends come here and tell us about how difficult it is

00:23:51: and how the voter in Wisconsin doesn't necessarily vote because of his or her foreign policy

00:23:58: possessions and doesn't necessarily understand why the transatlantic relationship is of importance

00:24:02: and how we need to all take this into consideration, to which I always like to reply, well, listen

00:24:07: to the voter in Hamburg doesn't necessarily care about these things either.

00:24:13: And because I can't speak on behalf of Germany, let me then speak on behalf of Estonia.

00:24:16: Well, the voter in Tartuma doesn't necessarily vote because of his or her foreign policy

00:24:22: ideals either.

00:24:25: So sometimes we need to have those open discussions behind closed doors.

00:24:29: And that's not actually impossible to do.

00:24:33: When we don't have those discussions, then whether we want it or not ends up undermining

00:24:40: trust.

00:24:42: And that's dangerous.

00:24:43: Right.

00:24:44: And this is something we've seen.

00:24:46: And this is often said that Germany's current problem is a communication problem.

00:24:49: I think it's not only a communication problem.

00:24:51: There's a substance issue as well.

00:24:52: But there is also a communication problem here that the Schultz administration in particular

00:24:57: has not been willing to outline the kind of clarity of vision that we've heard from all

00:25:02: of you today that actually victory is what is needed.

00:25:05: And Jonathan, you mentioned before we're very good at dressing up defeat in other language.

00:25:08: And I think we're pre-dressing it here in terms of restraint, prudence, Bisonenheit,

00:25:13: these watchwords for the German government at the moment, which don't understand that

00:25:17: actually we need to be going for that victory.

00:25:19: Well, the logical question comes to anyone's mind when the person listens to a government's

00:25:26: tiptoeing around the definition of victory.

00:25:29: The logical question is whether or not the tiptoeing is that particular government attempting

00:25:36: to keep the back door open.

00:25:40: It's not really wise communicative policy because you can't hide it indefinitely.

00:25:45: I mean, sooner or later it comes an infection point when you have to take a stand, go left

00:25:49: or go right.

00:25:51: But our inability to use clear language is not driven by our limitations when it comes

00:26:01: to articulation as such.

00:26:03: It's driven by something else.

00:26:05: And smart people know this.

00:26:08: And the people in the Kremlin are smart.

00:26:10: So I'm not worried necessarily what this does to the cohesion of the West or of Europe.

00:26:15: It does undermine trust because it raises those questions.

00:26:18: And you ask those questions and sometimes those questions end up being insulting because

00:26:21: they're maybe not, maybe that's not the case.

00:26:24: Maybe it's something domestic political.

00:26:26: Who knows?

00:26:27: The main worry is that in addition to fully being on board with what President Macron suggested,

00:26:35: which is strategic ambiguity with regard to certain issues, there should be some areas

00:26:40: where we should have strategic clarity.

00:26:43: And we seem to be lacking that.

00:26:45: And that's a problem because it communicates to the Russians that Putin's only remaining

00:26:53: argument in his theory of victory, which is that time is on his side.

00:26:57: And by the way, this is a very short-term proposition.

00:26:59: It's not like some other, you know, the Chinese think in centuries.

00:27:03: This Putin argument, they count in weeks and months.

00:27:07: Time is on my side.

00:27:08: Everything else is lost.

00:27:09: He clearly isn't making Russia great again.

00:27:11: He clearly isn't unifying the Russian world.

00:27:15: His troops clearly weren't welcomed with flowers.

00:27:18: But time is on his side.

00:27:21: And we communicate in ways that hints at us keeping the door open to some sort of a walkout.

00:27:34: Then unfortunately, that reinforces Putin arguments in the discussions that really matter.

00:27:38: And those discussions take place somewhere in the suburbs of Moscow, where people get

00:27:43: together amongst close friends, the people who keep Putin and his policies around.

00:27:49: We shouldn't be communicating strategic ambiguity in all areas of our policy.

00:27:54: No, 100 percent.

00:27:55: There should be clarity of vision backed up with ambiguity about how we're going to achieve

00:27:58: it to keep them on the back foot.

00:27:59: That's clear.

00:28:00: You mentioned before you can't speak for the voter in Hamburg.

00:28:02: Well, thankfully we can, slightly after these focus groups that we've just commissioned.

00:28:06: And for voters in Magdeburg and elsewhere around Germany, where we conducted a series

00:28:10: of these focus groups.

00:28:11: And one of the clear things that came out of that is a lack of understanding about this

00:28:15: clarity of vision and clarity of message.

00:28:17: And a feeling that comes from it that voters are not being well represented and they're

00:28:20: not being well managed and governed, actually, that there is a lack of leadership and a lack

00:28:24: of ability to rise to the challenges, which they very clearly care about.

00:28:28: And this was clearly geopolitical and geo economic challenges.

00:28:31: People do feel impact their lives, but they don't feel they're being served a political

00:28:35: offer that actually credibly manages that.

00:28:37: And so the encouraging part of this, of course, is the scope for political actors who want

00:28:41: to move into that space and who could actually communicate and come up with a credible vision.

00:28:45: Donut and I'm struck.

00:28:46: You said sort of defeats are hard to kind of understand because we can explain it away

00:28:52: over time.

00:28:53: And then it's difficult for us to figure out exactly when it happened.

00:28:56: You also said that victory is easy to commemorate.

00:28:59: But I would also say that victory seems to be, at least in this case, hard to define

00:29:03: or that we, you know, are having all kinds of disagreements about precisely how we define

00:29:08: victory, particularly in Ukraine.

00:29:11: So that's why I want to come to you, Benjamin, on this because of a panel that you were on

00:29:15: here at Leonard Mary.

00:29:18: We talked in our pillars of victory episode on Berlin's side out about what Ukrainian

00:29:22: victory means and how you achieve it.

00:29:24: You said that integrating Ukraine into NATO should be considered a key part of the definition

00:29:29: of Ukrainian victory.

00:29:30: And yet we're not expecting an invite to Ukraine at the upcoming Washington summit.

00:29:36: So why does it seem to be so hard to really figure out, you know, this diplomatic part

00:29:42: of Ukrainian victory between allies?

00:29:44: Is there some nervousness about what kind of reordering effects a victory in Ukraine

00:29:49: might have?

00:29:50: It's clear to me that the definition of victory can not only be territorial.

00:29:54: Putin has not lost hundreds of thousands of people just to gain control of a few towns

00:29:59: in Donbass.

00:30:01: This is about first dismantling the European security architecture.

00:30:05: And it's about wiping out Ukraine as a sovereign nation as in its ability to choose freely

00:30:11: and democratically its future and its Western orientation.

00:30:16: This started, we all know it in 2014 in Maidan, the day that European kids were getting shot

00:30:21: at for the European flag because they saw it as the inspiration for a better future.

00:30:27: And this is what Putin saw as a threat, a counter-democratic model at his borders.

00:30:36: And we couldn't see this.

00:30:37: We didn't support it in 2014.

00:30:38: I think we rose to a certain extent to the event in 2022.

00:30:43: So of course, this is part of this.

00:30:45: And it's the only way to ensure also the long-term stability and deterrence in the region.

00:30:51: We made a mistake when we closed the door to Georgia and Ukraine in 2008, thinking that

00:30:56: sending them an invitation to NATO would provoke Russia when it was exactly the other way around.

00:31:02: It provoked the aggression and it invited Russia to attack to see that they were not

00:31:06: being defended.

00:31:07: Now, there's no agreement today.

00:31:09: This is something, by the way, that if we're talking about the French site and vendor that

00:31:13: French-Khalili changed position on.

00:31:14: It was with Germany in 2008 and Bucharest closing the door to Ukraine.

00:31:19: And there's a sense in Paris that not only is it what Ukrainians are fighting for, but

00:31:24: this is also, if you look at the other options, people talk the Israeli option.

00:31:28: Israel has nuclear weapons.

00:31:29: If you talk about the South Korean option, there's close to 100,000 American troops there.

00:31:36: The only way to ensure long-term stability and deterrence is to have robust security

00:31:41: guarantees that pass through NATO.

00:31:42: Now, I think today the United States and Germany considered that this would send the wrong

00:31:48: message during the war.

00:31:49: And of course, it's not about having Ukraine join NATO during the war, but at least send

00:31:53: an invitation for after.

00:31:54: Clear signal once again, as Jonathan said, to Putin that we're in the long run, that

00:31:59: time is not playing in his favor.

00:32:02: But there's still the debate about this.

00:32:05: And I wish we'd go further and maybe just a point on Germany because I really don't want

00:32:10: to underestimate what's going on in Germany.

00:32:13: I mean, if you look at the dramatic increase in defense spending, if you look at what Germany

00:32:17: is doing in terms of weapons delivery for Ukraine, even the change in intellectual

00:32:23: software that I see from the German intellectual and political elite, I don't think it should

00:32:28: be underestimated.

00:32:31: If you're an external actor, France is a very presidential system where the president pushes

00:32:35: a button and the whole system follows.

00:32:37: And of course, we see Germany and you have the chance, it tells you, well, I have a different

00:32:41: coalition parties and then there's the Bundestag and there's the Lander.

00:32:43: So it's a very different system.

00:32:45: The one thing on which I think it's still frustrating for us is I find that Germany

00:32:52: has a much harder time overcoming certain taboos without the United States.

00:32:58: We went to long range missiles with the Brits without getting permission from whoever.

00:33:04: Same thing for the tanks.

00:33:07: We had a debate on Ukraine's NATO and the president said we need to support Ukraine's

00:33:12: accession into NATO.

00:33:14: And I think these are still things for the Germans.

00:33:17: It's complicated to go there without the United States.

00:33:20: Just to back up to the Bratislava speech just a second ago and the Ukraine's NATO membership

00:33:23: and its support from France, this was a key signal in terms of actually giving credibility

00:33:27: to that shift.

00:33:28: And this is what I actually asked President Macron to do at Globpsack last year to say,

00:33:32: look, it's all very well and good saying we're now listening to Central East Europe.

00:33:36: You're going to need some concrete steps to back that up.

00:33:38: So how about actually supporting Ukraine's NATO membership as one and credit to him?

00:33:43: Actually he then went and did that.

00:33:44: And it was great to see that brought a lot of credibility, but you're right.

00:33:47: That's not aligned yet with the German position, nor with the US position.

00:33:50: Although to make it clear and Sabina will come to you on this in just a moment, what's

00:33:54: good for the US is not necessarily good for Germany because we are much more drastically

00:33:59: and directly exposed to the threats that would come from not getting Ukraine right

00:34:03: than the Americans are.

00:34:04: So what's what's holding Germany back on this?

00:34:06: I think what you just described, Benjamin, is it's really a difference in strategic

00:34:11: culture between France and Germany.

00:34:14: And it also has a lot to do with Germany's post-war history.

00:34:18: So this is really about political traditions and it's very difficult to leave them behind.

00:34:24: I mean, and the whole discussion about strategic autonomy and Germany's hesitations with regard

00:34:31: to strategic autonomy, because there is such a strong focus on transatlantic relations.

00:34:37: That is one of the big differences between between Germany and France.

00:34:40: And I mean, I think we all know that the Franco German tandem, I mean, there have been some

00:34:47: bumps in the road, including because of this over the past few years.

00:34:53: I don't see this changing fundamentally.

00:34:58: I mean, the German attitude or the attitude of the German government with this government.

00:35:04: There is a lot of concern and also fear with regard to the upcoming presidential election

00:35:10: in the US.

00:35:14: I don't really see a plan B in Berlin right now, which may have to do with the fact that

00:35:20: and this brings us back a little bit to what we discussed at the beginning with the fact

00:35:25: that even though there have been profound changes in political thinking about Russia,

00:35:31: about the region, about European security in more general terms, the political approach

00:35:36: and I appreciate all the good words you said about what has been done in fact, because I

00:35:42: agree, you know, defense spending, it's it's it is really unprecedented.

00:35:46: So German policymakers are right when they point out that what has been done since February

00:35:51: 2022 was absolutely unthinkable, really literally until the 23rd of February 2022.

00:35:58: So this is true.

00:36:02: But still, when it comes to the implementation of Titan vendor, the approach is, let's say,

00:36:10: it's technocratic, it's also bureaucratic, and it is less strategic than it should be.

00:36:17: I wanted to say one tiny thing about communication.

00:36:21: Just wanted to point out that I don't think the whole government has a communication problem.

00:36:26: I mean, there are people in the government who have a very clear language about about

00:36:32: the war.

00:36:33: For example, for example, is widely celebrated for his police, for his police, for his police

00:36:36: story, the Minister of Defense.

00:36:37: I mean, we have a and he's a social democrat.

00:36:41: And he's very outspoken, both about the, well, the outcome of the war that that would be

00:36:49: in Germany's interest, but also about German security policy itself.

00:36:54: You know, I mean, he's the one who through the term Kriegsdurchdigkeit, how would you

00:36:58: translate that war readiness war readiness into the German debate.

00:37:02: See listeners, my German's improving.

00:37:04: Congratulations.

00:37:05: I'm very happy to hear it.

00:37:07: So yeah, so it's, it really has to do with this government.

00:37:14: It's a very, it's a difficult constellation, you know, with these three parties who do

00:37:18: not necessarily see eye to eye, but with Boris Pistorius taking his position, you also see

00:37:23: that there is an internal debate in the social democratic party.

00:37:27: You do.

00:37:28: And also Pistorius is reward for that clear communication has been to be consistently

00:37:31: rated the most popular politician in Germany.

00:37:33: So again, there would be a lesson here if we were willing to learn it.

00:37:36: What we also have to be aware of is that there are, I think there are different necessities

00:37:41: when it comes to talking about the war in different European societies.

00:37:46: I mean, I think it was the Estonian defense minister who said yesterday, we should not

00:37:49: talk about a potential Ukrainian defeat because this is basically, it's just depressing and

00:37:55: it's discouraging.

00:37:56: We, we are discouraging the Ukrainians and ourselves.

00:38:00: I think in Germany, it's exactly the other way around.

00:38:03: I think in Germany, we have to talk about the potential knock on effects of a Ukrainian

00:38:11: defeat in order to make it clear to people what, what, what the stakes are really, because

00:38:16: I think many people still don't understand that.

00:38:18: That's right.

00:38:19: And that's what we've been trying to do also with some of our publications with some of

00:38:22: the clear language that's been coming out of the action group, Titan vendor and it to

00:38:25: be fair, some German politicians have communicated this very clearly, Roger Kiesewetter, Norbert

00:38:29: Rutgen, also a lot of the greens and some from the FTP too.

00:38:32: But Jonathan, I want to come to you on this because you, in your TED talk and also what

00:38:36: you mentioned earlier, the only metric that matters is winning.

00:38:39: And while we might give credit to Germany for what's been done, pointing to what we've

00:38:43: done doesn't really get us to what we need to do.

00:38:45: Absolutely.

00:38:46: And before going into that question, I just want to aggressively agree.

00:38:51: We have to make it absolutely clear what the stakes are.

00:38:54: For human beings in democracies, we're not going to take the hard steps unless we understand

00:39:01: that the alternative to those steps is even worse.

00:39:06: That's the only thing that can make us move.

00:39:08: So why not talk openly about the stakes?

00:39:12: Let's not be afraid of the truth.

00:39:15: And the only metric that matters indeed is whether or not we win.

00:39:19: The outcome is what matters.

00:39:20: Can I link those two things just very briefly?

00:39:23: Because this also came up on a discussion with Tim Snyder and Elliot Cohen and Marcus

00:39:26: Tarkner yesterday.

00:39:27: The slogan of this conference, "Let us not despair but act."

00:39:30: Indeed, let us not despair, but we have to be absolutely clear-eyed about the threats

00:39:33: that we face.

00:39:34: It's what we're going to do with them that actually matters, that changes the difference

00:39:37: from fear as paralysis into fear as driver for credible action.

00:39:40: So we have to know what the stakes are.

00:39:42: We have to know what our goals are.

00:39:45: And then we have to focus on those goals.

00:39:48: And then the debate could revolve around the issues of what is to be done.

00:39:52: And there are obviously dilemmas involved.

00:39:55: I'm not going to argue that some of the concerns that some nations have are somehow lacking

00:40:01: in legitimacy.

00:40:04: But let's have those debates then.

00:40:05: But when it comes to the stakes, when it comes to our shared goals, without those, we can't

00:40:10: really expect to pull this off.

00:40:13: I sometimes listen to our European and Western leaders get agitated on the point that, "Look,

00:40:22: but we've done so much."

00:40:24: And agitated at, for instance, the Ukrainians when they're critical still, because obviously

00:40:31: we've done a lot and we've made major changes and Germany has done so and France has done

00:40:36: so, frankly, Estonia has done so.

00:40:39: And it hasn't been easy, obviously.

00:40:42: But look at the wider picture.

00:40:44: We have a house that's on fire.

00:40:47: An active arsonist is not only pouring gasoline but sending fire to additional rooms.

00:40:52: People are dying in the house.

00:40:54: And now we've showed up with the fire trucks.

00:40:57: Some arrived an hour late.

00:40:59: Some arrived a year late.

00:41:02: Some of the water misses the target.

00:41:05: Some of it is useful.

00:41:07: But the house is still on fire.

00:41:09: And now the fire brigades around the building are telling the families in the house that,

00:41:15: "Look, don't be critical of us.

00:41:17: We showed up.

00:41:18: They want to survive this."

00:41:20: And for as long as the war is ongoing, we haven't really achieved what we're supposed to achieve.

00:41:29: So all of this talk on how well we've done, I fully agree with Ben, we shouldn't be congratulating

00:41:38: ourselves for a victory that we have yet to achieve.

00:41:42: All of this is nothing but waste of time.

00:41:47: We need to focus.

00:41:48: And the same, by the way, applies to the question of, are we Estonians happy now that the others

00:41:54: have recognized that we will write five years ago?

00:41:57: We don't care.

00:41:59: We don't care.

00:42:00: We'll deal with this in the future.

00:42:02: We'll have a seminar.

00:42:04: We'll get historians together.

00:42:05: It's going to be fun.

00:42:07: We'll share war stories.

00:42:08: Today, the focus should be on the future and only on the future.

00:42:13: Sabina, I'm struck actually by something you said, which relates exactly to what Jonathan

00:42:18: just said.

00:42:19: We have a division between those who think that the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat

00:42:24: can be contained and those who don't think that it could be contained.

00:42:28: So the house on fire analogy here is very, very apt.

00:42:32: It got me to what you said yesterday.

00:42:34: Who are those?

00:42:37: Is that fair?

00:42:39: And also, that really seems to fly into, we remember a Rolf Mutsenich in Germany saying

00:42:47: that we should freeze the conflict, for example, this idea that you could contain this.

00:42:51: Now, that seems to fly in the face of what we hear from our Nordic and Baltic friends

00:42:55: who say that their expectations, despite all of this talk in Germany, are still really

00:42:59: high.

00:43:00: And it also contradicts what's been said in Paris very clearly too.

00:43:03: It rather puts Germany and those others who don't see the potential spillover out on a

00:43:07: limb, doesn't it?

00:43:08: Well, I was very unhappy with this statement by Rolf Mutsenich.

00:43:11: I mean, I hated the term frozen conflict before February 2022.

00:43:16: I hate it even more now.

00:43:17: And I've been fighting against it for the past, I don't know, 10, 15 years because I've

00:43:21: done a lot of work on unresolved conflicts in the EU's Eastern neighborhood.

00:43:26: And I think it's just totally, completely inappropriate as a term.

00:43:30: So I was very unhappy also because I think the whole idea of, I mean, I think it's just

00:43:37: completely impossible to freeze this war.

00:43:40: It's not possible.

00:43:42: And especially not in the current situation and along the current front line.

00:43:47: So also strategically and tactically, it's just very stupid.

00:43:52: On the questioning of whether or not the war and its implications are containable, I think

00:44:03: you find people who think they are containable.

00:44:08: It is containable not only in Germany in different parties, but you also find them in the United

00:44:14: States for instance.

00:44:15: So the difference is between those who think that the effects of a Russian victory on

00:44:27: Europe and also the global order would be so comprehensive, negative that basically it

00:44:36: would put the rules based international order at risk.

00:44:39: And then there are those who believe that it is possible actually to contain the effects

00:44:45: so that they don't destabilize the European and the rules based international order.

00:44:50: So it is important to not to become too involved in Europe to contain the war and the conflict

00:44:56: to Ukraine in order to be able to invest more capacities in Asia.

00:45:02: So these are two very different strategic outlooks, but you have these positions in both political

00:45:08: communities.

00:45:09: And you could also add that of course the Russia's war against Ukraine and its outcome

00:45:14: are part of the systemic rivalry and China is watching this very closely.

00:45:18: I want to speak about the idea that it's possible to contain the war with regard to

00:45:23: Germany and the US.

00:45:25: And I mean you find people in Germany and the US who think that but for different reasons.

00:45:30: So I think in Germany the idea speaks to a longing for peace in significant segments

00:45:36: of German society.

00:45:37: And there's really been a change in language on this in Paris.

00:45:40: And quite clearly I mean President Macron's rhetorical move to first of all say Russia's

00:45:45: defeat is necessary as well as Ukraine's victory to not rule out putting ground troops into

00:45:50: Ukraine actually to get this strategic ambiguity in service that has shown that that's been

00:45:54: a switch that's been made in Paris.

00:45:56: But how credible is that beyond the rhetoric?

00:45:58: I think it's very credible.

00:45:59: I mean there's a sense that first Russia's victory would be a catastrophic defeat for

00:46:05: Europe.

00:46:06: I mean that it's all the US existence that's at stake that we would have a Russia that would

00:46:09: be at the border of the Baltic states, Romania, Poland and more aggressive than ever.

00:46:14: And especially in the context of the questions arising from the United States with the election

00:46:18: and with the question on the US security guarantees down the road.

00:46:22: And on the strategic ambiguity I mean there's a sense that we've been self-censuring negotiating

00:46:28: with ourselves for the last two years constantly signaling to the adversary our own limits and

00:46:32: red lines where we have an adversary Russia that has put no such red line either on its

00:46:36: rhetoric or on its action.

00:46:38: And so you have to turn it around and maybe give him something to think about.

00:46:43: Now when it comes to being backed by substance I mean look if you look at the last ranking

00:46:50: the kill ranking that takes into account support for multilateral institution like the European

00:46:54: Peace Facility and everything that other countries used to refinance their support for Ukraine.

00:46:58: France has ranked third behind the United States and Germany.

00:47:02: Now of course if you take per GDP or you know countries like Estonia or way above us if

00:47:09: the question is and by the way and these rankings don't take into account the quality

00:47:14: of the weapons like a Caesar cannon is not very expensive will be very effective on the

00:47:18: ground.

00:47:19: If the question is should we do more I think we should all do more.

00:47:22: We should all do more in quantity we should be very creative about how we find resources

00:47:26: also to sustain our support.

00:47:28: I'm very supportive of the Estonian idea that pushed forward by...

00:47:31: Prime Minister Kai has to have a defense Euro bonds, 100 billion on the table.

00:47:36: We consider that COVID was an existential crisis and we created common debt.

00:47:40: Well, I do think that's existential as well. So let's create common debt.

00:47:43: I introduced a resolution in the French parliament to confiscate Russian frozen assets,

00:47:48: not only the windfall profits, but I think we have to build the legal framework

00:47:51: to go after the capital. The aggressor should pay for the reparation and the support for Ukraine.

00:47:57: So let's think about, once again, there's no quick fix to this. We're in the long haul.

00:48:03: So let's think about how we can sustain our support in the long haul.

00:48:06: Right. And it's understanding what those different pillars of victory actually are,

00:48:09: the financial and economic, as well as the military, and putting it together with the

00:48:12: diplomatic that gives us the strategic position and street it means to actually go forward,

00:48:16: which is what we covered on our Pillars of Victory multiple episode with some wonderful

00:48:20: guests that you can listen into. There's another link to that in the show notes, of course.

00:48:24: But I want to come to this point on coherence more widely because Sabina, you mentioned before

00:48:28: that Berlin is in lockstep with Washington on its position for Ukraine. But we can all see

00:48:34: Berlin is not in lockstep with Washington when it comes to China or on geoeconomics more widely.

00:48:39: And I think this, this for me at least points to what the real Titan vendor would actually be,

00:48:44: which is a clear strategic approach. And we've mentioned different strategic cultures.

00:48:48: But Ben, I want to come back to you first on this because you,

00:48:51: you talked about strategic autonomy and so on. And we could disagree whether that's autonomy

00:48:54: from the US or it's more strategic agency for Europe, which I think is a more

00:48:58: compelling way to put it certainly to Berlin. But it needs a strategy. And every time Macron

00:49:03: has put something forward on this, he's been waiting for a response from Berlin and it

00:49:07: frankly hasn't come. There was a lot of frustration in Paris after the 2017 Sorbonne

00:49:11: speech where he did lay out ambitious vision for sovereignty and agency. And we felt there was

00:49:17: no response from Berlin. Now we did move forward, did a lot of things. I mean, at the end of the day,

00:49:22: the relationship with Chancellor Merkel did give us the bonds on COVID, the recovery package,

00:49:29: was 800 billion euros. But there's a lot more to do as you talked about geoeconomics. I mean,

00:49:34: it is also the end of a certain naivete that trade necessarily leads to the pacification of

00:49:41: relations. I mean, we've seen on the contrary that energy was used as a weapon by Russia as

00:49:47: leveraged over our democracies. And we're going to find the same situation probably tomorrow

00:49:53: with China. So the question is not to cut ourselves from trade, of course not, but it's to protect

00:49:57: ourselves, to protect our industrial interests, to screen investments. And we've led 10 years ago,

00:50:03: China by harbouring in Athens. I mean, so it is a good stake at the port in Hamburg.

00:50:08: Absolutely, which was criticized by France, by the way. So it is about giving ourselves the tools

00:50:16: to be able to defend ourselves in this respect. But I don't want to be too defensive about it,

00:50:22: because we were talking about it yesterday. It is also about making Europe a competitive,

00:50:26: innovative continent. I mean, we've lost 20 to 25 points of GDP from the United States

00:50:33: in since 2008, because the US has invested massively in its economic recovery, in its green and

00:50:40: industry, in its tech industry, because it has extraordinarily competitive university campuses,

00:50:48: etc. etc. And the capital market system, it actually works to move from start up to scale up.

00:50:52: And integrate a capital market, of course. Right. Now, it's often said that we do need

00:50:57: more leadership when we need more strategy in Europe. I've just said it, but Jonathan,

00:51:00: you're too modest to say it, I'm sure. But we've got that leadership coming from the Baltic states,

00:51:04: haven't we? I mean, your for freedom agenda is the bones of this kind of strategy we need,

00:51:09: isn't it? It depends on how you want to find leadership. If leadership is just being ambitious

00:51:13: and clear in our messages, then I'm very happy to take the compliment. But true leadership

00:51:21: really depends on whether or not others will follow. And on some points, we've been able to do,

00:51:26: you know, demonstrate leadership in other cases, we haven't been. So it depends,

00:51:31: depends on whether or not we actually can get others to follow. The way it usually works

00:51:35: is not by others following you, but by others taking your ideas on board and making those ideas

00:51:42: their own. So a good leader, I mean, the fact that you're a leader is only evident during the phase

00:51:50: where your leadership really is in question. By the time your leadership is solidified,

00:51:55: those are no longer your ideas. They then become everyone's ideas. So there's a bit of a tragic

00:52:01: note in that sort of leadership. But there's one more point I want to underline. Leadership or

00:52:07: demonstrated success, a successful leadership is only heroic from the benefit of the hindsight.

00:52:13: By definition, a leader has to put him or herself ahead of the pack that means alone.

00:52:20: And at a moment before others join and take those ideas and make them their own,

00:52:26: the leader is alone. That runs counter to every part of our foreign policy DNA.

00:52:33: Never alone again is part of our DNA. So it's not, it's not an easy ride. It takes a lot of courage.

00:52:45: It takes a lot of willingness to take risks. We'd rather not do it, to be honest with you.

00:52:51: The only reason why we ever put ourselves out there, expose ourselves in a position where we're

00:52:57: by definition alone is because we understand what the stakes are. And we understand that the risk

00:53:05: of not doing so is far greater than the risk of sometimes putting ourselves out there and being

00:53:12: alone. But I don't want to leave the people with an impression that this is a, you know,

00:53:18: all heroic, simple stuff. It is hard. It's risky. It's rather terrible, I should say. I'd rather

00:53:27: not do it. Right. And this is it. Leadership is a responsibility. It's a serious responsibility.

00:53:32: Some take leadership when they get glory, but you rarely take real leadership to get the glory,

00:53:37: if it's true leadership. Victories have several fathers. Defeats are orphans.

00:53:41: We know that. And again, I want to underline this. You can only lead others when they buy into the

00:53:47: idea that you represent. And then that idea becomes theirs. It becomes theirs. Great leaders in

00:53:53: history. I mean, we talk about them as historical figures, but they were great because they were

00:53:57: able to not just have people follow them as individuals, but have people follow that idea,

00:54:04: the churchals of the past. And then the idea is shared by others. So you don't get to be

00:54:11: heroic as an individual for long. People take your idea on board, and you're only successful if you

00:54:17: manage to do that. That requires them to recognize what's going on. And yes, point we made about

00:54:21: understanding central and eastern Europe, listening to those and understanding where

00:54:25: leadership is actually coming from. So, I mean, it would surely be a step to the true site and

00:54:29: vendor that not only Germany, but Europe needs, wouldn't it? Yeah, absolutely. And I mean, we

00:54:34: talked about German leadership earlier in our discussion. I think it is very important at the

00:54:38: same time for me, and this is really against the background of German history in the 20th century,

00:54:45: to me, the embeddedness of German policy within the European framework is also extremely important.

00:54:51: So one is possible only in combination with the other. And yeah, this is the way I want to see

00:54:58: German policy evolve. I mean, it's a very abstract idea of peace. Again, it has a lot to do with

00:55:04: German history in the 20th century and some other factors. But this is very important. And the idea

00:55:09: that it's possible to contain the war and the conflict more or less to Ukraine so that it doesn't

00:55:15: affect Germany and the European Union is very important in that respect. And I think, you know,

00:55:21: what we see now in certain corners of the German political debate also, after the beginning of

00:55:27: the election campaign has to do with that. In the US, it's different. In the US, I think this position

00:55:33: is underpinned by the global strategic vision. And the US, I mean, these are people who argue that

00:55:40: the US should have and must have their focus on Asia, on China. They are. And this again,

00:55:45: reflects that strategic distance between the two countries rather than the similarity that's often

00:55:50: actually pointed out. We see on the one hand a very clear vision of systemic competition

00:55:54: that is there. And on the other, an attempt to salvage what you can from the flat world of

00:55:57: globalization by clinging to multi-polarity. And that, of course, would be the negative

00:56:01: interpretation of strategic autonomy that Europe would exist as that autonomous poll,

00:56:05: regardless of values. And I think that's something that comes out very clearly from this

00:56:09: conference is something that people are really trying to avoid here. But the message hasn't

00:56:12: necessarily penetrated every other. Well, it's not penetrated all of the chancellories of Europe.

00:56:17: Let's say, let's put it in that sense. Not only is China watching, the world is watching.

00:56:21: And the world is watching us, who we've proclaimed to have the greatest military alliance in the

00:56:25: history of the world, which I believe to be true, combined the population of more than a billion

00:56:30: people, 440 million of us Europeans, in a fight that we've many of us have said is existential,

00:56:38: like President Macron, Prime Minister Carlos, a fight for our future with a country that Senator

00:56:44: John McCain famously described as nothing but a gas station with nukes. Okay, we're in this struggle.

00:56:50: It's been going on for three years. And it seems to be a draw at the moment. So when we look at how

00:56:57: the world reacts, not only vis-a-vis the war in Ukraine, but vis-a-vis the West in general,

00:57:03: and we see them sort of sitting on the fence, then that's the reason why. That's the reason why.

00:57:09: And there is no question, I don't think in anybody's mind, that in the, not even talking about

00:57:14: the long term in the midterm, Europe is going to be successful in countering Russia. The question

00:57:22: is about the Russia challenge. To look down the 21st century, the list of challenges is huge.

00:57:28: Russia is perhaps not the most significant one when you look at it from a sort of a historic

00:57:34: perspective. We don't come across as definitive winners of the century. And that's our fault.

00:57:45: Obviously, everything is interconnected. Our success in Ukraine will lead to a credibility

00:57:52: with regard to other conflicts out there. So I think we need to be, we need to be better,

00:57:58: we need to be better at connecting those dots and pursuing a coherent strategy, not only in

00:58:03: Europe, but obviously also globally. The historical anomaly of democracy's dominance

00:58:08: came about by us really being the best we could be. We need to get back that winning mentality,

00:58:12: don't we Ben? We need to get back that winning mentality. And I want to add something because

00:58:16: we talked about leadership and communicating a definition of victory. And I say this as a

00:58:23: politician, now elected in Paris. We should not forget that our public opinions are one of the

00:58:30: fronts. And Putin is very aware of this. He's communicating his threats when he's talking

00:58:36: about nuclear weapons. It's clearly about talking to our public opinions. And one thing that struck

00:58:42: me when I was in DC in January, making the case with a few colleagues from the Baltic States and

00:58:49: others to representatives, Democrats and Republicans making the case for unblocking the aid to Ukraine

00:58:56: is that some of the Republicans who were skeptical did make, I think, an argument that was reasonable.

00:59:01: They said, "President Biden has not articulated what our victory is, what our end game is,

00:59:07: what we're going to use this money for." And I thought, as much as I wanted them to approve the

00:59:12: aid, I thought, "Okay, this is not a crazy point." And it's really important that we do this. It's

00:59:17: really important that we not only put it into the framework of what we've been saying, which is

00:59:22: defending the existence of Europe, the European security architecture, but also phrasing it

00:59:29: very concretely in terms of what impact it will have on everyday living, on the ability of Russia

00:59:35: to control the cost of food, the cost of energy, and how that would affect the purchasing power of

00:59:42: the everyday French. And this is where I want to go back to what you both said early on. Yes, we

00:59:47: should talk about the cost of defeat. Because the problem is when we talk about everything that

00:59:52: we've spent and done in the last two years to support Ukraine, and of course, sometimes it's

00:59:56: at the expense of other things, one of the problems in politics is that you never have the

01:00:01: counterfactual. You never have the price of inaction or the price of Russian victory and the

01:00:07: concrete impact it would have on our societies. And I think that's something that when you talk

01:00:11: about leadership, it's extremely important to be able to regularly articulate this to our public

01:00:16: opinions. Right. And that's exactly what the demand that seemed to come across in our focus group

01:00:20: would suggest. But Sabina, last word to you, this is surely what the German government would need

01:00:25: to do if there's to be a true Titan vendor worthy of the name to articulate that vision,

01:00:30: clearly, and a strategy for achieving it, not only as a load star for policymaking, but as a

01:00:34: rallying point for the nation. I agree with that. I wanted to focus on something different. I mean,

01:00:41: I think it is important to understand that 2024 will be a very decisive year. I talked a lot

01:00:48: at Leonard Mary conference with Moldovan colleagues. They are under massive permanent

01:00:55: hybrid attack. If Russia advances and we know that it's not going well in Ukraine at the moment

01:01:01: for Ukraine for reasons that have a lot to do with our own policies. If Russia advances along the

01:01:07: Black Sea coast, Moldova will be under immediate threat again. Developments in Georgia are extremely

01:01:13: worrying. I've been told by one person that he's not an oligarch. He's a monogarch. So the monogarch

01:01:22: of Georgia is actually gearing up to a post Russian victory scenario of regional development.

01:01:32: And he saw this as one of the reasons for the for the turn the Georgian government has taken

01:01:37: over the past months and probably, I mean, it's a trend so several years. So I think 2024 will be

01:01:44: very, very decisive also with regard to our own states and societies. It's a super election year.

01:01:51: So I mean, I'm watching this. I'm concerned. I'm a little less optimistic than you are with the

01:01:58: prospect with regard to the prospects of success. So I think we really need to get our acts together.

01:02:04: So, you know, don't despair, but act is the motto of this conference. And I think we should take

01:02:10: it to heart. Absolutely. That speaks to the urgency that we have in our democratic moment and in our

01:02:15: strategic moment. Thank you very much once again to our guests today, Benjamin Haddad, Jonathan

01:02:19: Seviov and Sabina Fisher. Now, as we said earlier in the show, we did hear from Estonian Prime Minister

01:02:25: Kaya Kallis herself, who in addition to her panel appearances at the Leonard Mary Conference in

01:02:30: Tallinn, spoke to international media during a briefing at Stenbach House, the Estonian government's

01:02:36: official seat. So we get to finish up our last regular episode of this season, hearing from one

01:02:42: of Europe's most impressive leaders, don't we, Ben? We certainly do. And at the time of recording

01:02:47: this special intro and the segues that we put between our different segments of this Berlin

01:02:52: Side Out, it looks like Kaya Kallis is actually gaining a lot of support for a really top job

01:02:57: in Brussels. Her name is very much in the mix for the position of HRVP, or the High Representative

01:03:03: for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission,

01:03:08: which is widely considered one of the top three jobs. Why is her name in the running? Well,

01:03:13: there are some sort of quota based reasons. One is the party affiliation that she has, which is the

01:03:19: Renew Europe or Liberal Party. And with Ursula von der Leyen likely to become Commission President

01:03:26: again. And the name's in the running for the Council President of Antonio Costa of Portugal,

01:03:31: from respectively the European People's Party, the centre right, and the Socialist and Democrats,

01:03:37: the centre left, that leaves the Liberals needing a top job. So Kaya Kallis ticks that box. She also

01:03:43: ticks the box of being from Central and Eastern Europe, which with von der Leyen, again in poll

01:03:48: position for the Commission President, coming from Western or Northern Western Europe. And Costa

01:03:54: coming from Portugal in Southern Europe leaves Central and Eastern Europe needing a top spot

01:03:59: as well. And so she ticks that box. But let's be very clear, Kaya Kallis is not in the running

01:04:05: because she ticks boxes. Kaya Kallis is in the running because of how impressive she has been

01:04:11: as a leader, particularly over the last two years. And now she will have the chance, we hope, to show

01:04:16: that leadership talent, to show those leadership skills on the top stage. And it would certainly

01:04:21: be a massive step change from what we've seen from Josette Borel in recent times, if Kallis can

01:04:27: bring the kind of approach that she brought to being Prime Minister of Estonia into the being

01:04:31: the position of high representative. And she's certainly aware of the key challenges that we

01:04:37: face. So let's turn to her now for our first answer in that press conference and hear from her about

01:04:42: what their strategic priorities are for 2024 and how serious the challenge in Ukraine actually is.

01:04:48: I think 2024 is really a year of strategic defense. I think what I said yesterday,

01:04:58: in 2023 we were maybe overly optimistic. I mean, everybody was talking about the

01:05:06: counter offensive and big disappointments come from big expectations. So I think we

01:05:14: should avoid a mistake of being overly pessimistic in 2024. Yes, we need to be very honest and open

01:05:24: about this. The support needs to get to Ukraine, sure, but fast. And we have to make sure that

01:05:33: we do not create pessimism from pessimism. I mean, that, you know, this is all circling around.

01:05:40: This would lead to inaction. It's like, okay, there's nothing to do there. You know, it's all

01:05:46: going down. So we don't have to do anything. But I think this is wrong. We still have to

01:05:55: believe in Ukraine's victory and also build our strategies around that. All the actions we do will

01:06:02: follow that suit. So Ben Kallis encouraged us just there to keep believing in Ukraine's victory.

01:06:09: But we also heard from Estonian Foreign Minister Marga Sakna on our talent side out special with

01:06:13: Timothy Snyder, Elliot Cohen, and Anna Isabel-Zavier that we can't just believe we have to act.

01:06:19: But believing in victory first helps you figure out how to act, right? It is the first step.

01:06:24: Well, it does. For that, you have to understand why we need to win, why it's so absolutely crucial

01:06:29: that Ukraine and indeed the whole of Europe wins a common victory, as Robin Wagner told us on our

01:06:35: Pillars of Victory episode in Ukraine and that Russia is defeated there. So you have to understand

01:06:40: that. But I'd actually also point to something Elliot Cohen said in that episode, where he

01:06:45: talked about the psychologist William James and saying that you don't do brave things because

01:06:50: you have brave feelings, but rather you get the brave feelings when you do brave things.

01:06:55: And when you commit to winning, that will make winners of us all. And that's the attitude I

01:07:00: think we actually have to take. So Prime Minister Kallis said something about this too, this

01:07:05: action that you get from that attitude. So specifically what we as a collective West have

01:07:11: to commit concretely to get to victory. Our promise is to not save lives. The actual

01:07:17: weapons in the hands of Ukrainian soldiers do. Actually, air defense does. So that's why we need

01:07:26: to really deliver. Sometimes I feel that many things are mixed up in the picture. The promise

01:07:36: is giving to Ukraine, long term promises and actual deliverables. So if we put them all together,

01:07:46: we can bat ourselves in the back and say that, oh, we have done a lot. But actually,

01:07:51: when I hear they all go through the NATO's bases in Poland and they actually know what

01:08:00: Ukraine is getting. And that is not the promises, the slogans, what we hear. So that is a real

01:08:09: worry regarding this. Of course, our military aid to Ukraine has been over 500 million. And this

01:08:17: amounts to more than 1.3 percent of our GDP. We have also agreed to allocate long term support,

01:08:26: 0.25 percent of our GDP from 24 to 27 to Ukraine as military aid. And if all countries would do

01:08:37: the same, then it would actually lead to Ukraine's victory. Ben, as you've said before, we're often

01:08:44: afraid of our own power in the West. What would happen if we actually did act appropriately to

01:08:50: bring about our strategic objectives? Now, part of that is because the Russian narrative isn't

01:08:55: questioned nearly enough in the West. Russia is a country with an economy smaller than Canada's,

01:09:01: but it occupies a big spot in our collective Western imagination. So we've heard from the

01:09:05: Prime Minister there about what we need to do, the acts that we need to take to bring about

01:09:11: our strategic objectives. But Ben, as you've said before, often we're afraid of our own power to do

01:09:16: that. Now, part of that is because the Russian narrative isn't questioned nearly enough in the

01:09:22: West. It is a country with an economy that is smaller than Canada's, actually, but it occupies

01:09:26: a big spot in our collective Western imagination, doesn't it? It does. And this is a really

01:09:31: interesting point because this is where Russia's approach mirrors that of the populists in our own

01:09:35: societies and the anti-democratic forces, which comes as no surprise. I mean, Russia has absolutely

01:09:41: zero soft power. We're not going to see people moving en masse to Russia or suggesting that we

01:09:45: really adopt the Russian model. Because when implied in practice, what that Russian model means too

01:09:51: often is no inside toilets, rampant poverty, public drunkenness, poor health outcomes, domestic

01:09:57: violence, and all sorts of other things that we've actually put largely into the past in our country.

01:10:01: So it's like a step back in time. And if that's what you mean by traditional values, then well,

01:10:05: you're welcome to them. But certainly that's not where I would see Europe's future. And I don't

01:10:09: think anyone sensible actually would. The point here is that Russia pretends to provide a very

01:10:16: simple solution to all of the West's woes. And for sure, there are things we need to fix in our

01:10:21: societies. There are things we need to get right. We need to give people that sense of a credible

01:10:25: sense of a hopeful future that we've talked about many times on the show. But certainly adopting

01:10:30: the Russian approach is absolutely not the way to go about that. But again, it's about providing a

01:10:35: very simplistic and simple answer to what are in fact complex problems. So wouldn't it be nice

01:10:41: if there were such a simple answer? Well, there isn't. And it's actually about doing the hard work

01:10:45: to understand how we go about both fixing our problems, but also playing on those real strengths,

01:10:50: which have included the tolerance and diversity that you mentioned in alluding to gay ropa.

01:10:54: We don't have to convince anyone of the merits of flat whites and lattes, I think. But at the same

01:10:59: time, there are serious things that we actually need to fix. And one of the people who's been doing

01:11:03: most thinking about that and how we actually put that in combination with resolute defense

01:11:08: is Prime Minister Kalas. Now, one journalist asked the Prime Minister about that Russian narrative,

01:11:14: and you've just provided a very, one of my favorite refutations of it that I think I've

01:11:18: ever heard. But somehow it still sticks in some people's minds in the West simply because they

01:11:25: don't actually know very much about how ordinary Russians actually live, which you've also talked

01:11:31: about just now. There is still this idea that Russia is a bastion of traditional values against the

01:11:38: gay ropa of a decadent West that we've talked about. So how should we address that narrative?

01:11:43: Let's hear from the Prime Minister on this. It's a very good book by Timothee Schneider,

01:11:47: The Road to Unfreedom, that shows that when Russia can't become the West, the West will become Russia,

01:11:53: and how the narratives of the far right are actually meeting the narratives of Russia regarding

01:12:00: Europe. This is that Europe is morally corrupt. That means all the gay marriages and all these

01:12:06: things, not the traditional family. And then Europe is under a migration pressure, and that

01:12:12: migration pressure is Muslim migration mostly. So now they are actually creating the situation where

01:12:19: it's not the only narrative, but actually people see the migration pressure is there. They created

01:12:25: from Syria, bombing Syria, back then Wagner in Africa, so that where do the migrants go?

01:12:34: They go to Europe. So actually they are creating this and also from Ukraine. They all come to

01:12:41: Europe. And what our adversaries know is that migration is our vulnerability.

01:12:49: And therefore these two meet. Now coming to the European elections, then all these parties

01:13:01: anti-migration, I mean, I think what we have to understand, I would say so, that

01:13:14: Russia is weaponizing migration. Our adversaries are weaponizing migration.

01:13:19: But they are also weaponizing human rights because they know that human rights are

01:13:25: very important to European Union. So I mean, they push the migrants over the border. They

01:13:33: create the problems for European side because they weaponize this, that it's human rights.

01:13:42: You have to accept those people. And that is, of course, water to the middle of the far right.

01:13:49: The far right, at least in Estonia, and I've read from other parts of Europe as well,

01:13:56: they are actually quite careful regarding Ukraine. So they are saying that,

01:14:08: of course, we support Ukraine, but we have done enough. So it is not so direct that they are

01:14:18: against Ukraine or supporting Ukraine. So they don't go very directly, but they do this,

01:14:27: the narratives regarding Ukrainians in our societies, and we have done enough.

01:14:35: I mean, now our own people need support. And let's draw the line and have,

01:14:40: that is gone, that is not our problem. So it is not as direct, but it's definitely going to

01:14:49: have an effect because the populists are always coming up with simple solutions to very complex

01:14:57: problems. One example of how Russian narratives can penetrate our society comes up whenever we

01:15:03: hear arguments that NATO expansion provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Now, Prime Minister

01:15:09: Kalis was asked about countering this narrative, and she amusingly called it "my favorite topic."

01:15:16: I have to tell you a story for this. Sorry, but it's also related to a book. So it's a very good

01:15:25: book, "Marie Seretí, Not One Inch." Where did this idea come that Russia was promised that

01:15:35: NATO is not enlarging? And it's a very good book, very good historical, I mean, very good work done

01:15:43: and very well written and everything. And so I am in France. I have my birthday weekend, I get this

01:15:50: book, I'm reading this book on the beach and there's an American couple just beside me. And

01:15:59: they ask, is it a good book? I say, oh, it's so good book. And then we go back to Estonia. I am in

01:16:06: airport or I mean traveling back to Estonia and I'm reaching the conclusion of this book.

01:16:12: And I was like, how can she come to such a conclusion based on such good work that she has

01:16:19: done? So basically that we should have offered Russia something. They have legitimate security

01:16:24: interests or whatever. Why I'm telling this is that then I said that I really, first I thought that,

01:16:32: oh my god, I recommended this book to the Americans and now they are thinking that we should offer

01:16:37: something to Russia. But then I said to Munich Security Conference, you know, Christa Fosken,

01:16:46: I said that can you invite her? I really want to debate her on the conclusion. And he said, fine.

01:16:52: And we had this debate there regarding this, whether it was promised or not. And whether there

01:17:01: should be something offered to them. By the way, she also told that, you know, she's a historian

01:17:10: working in a university and she gets a call from Jens Stoltenberg's office and they say that,

01:17:17: you know, Jens Stoltenberg wants to have a dinner with you because Kajagal has recommended your book.

01:17:22: And he has read the book and he wants to discuss this. It's like, okay, I get the dinner two hours

01:17:29: with Jens Stoltenberg because you recommended the book. But anyway, so I think there are a lot

01:17:34: of good arguments. One is that what I tried to, what I say in the global south is that

01:17:39: every country has the right to choose their defense alliances. I mean, believe me, read this

01:17:46: book and you can understand they didn't want us in NATO. We worked so hard to get into NATO. So it

01:17:53: wasn't like NATO wants to expand. No, we wanted to get in because we have a neighbor like this.

01:17:59: Because we are in NATO, we don't have a war like Ukraine has because we are under NATO's umbrella.

01:18:09: And it is not about, you know, NATO is not about, it's not threatening Russia. Not the single

01:18:22: European or NATO country is threatening Russia. I mean, not Latvians, not us. We are not declaring war

01:18:29: on Russia. No, definitely not. So we are not presenting any threats. So what are they afraid of?

01:18:39: So, I mean, these are the things and I think what mostly works is that it was our wish.

01:18:50: We worked so hard. We are able to really confront this narrative, but it keeps on popping up.

01:18:57: And this is such an important point that Prime Minister Kallas made there, talking about the very

01:19:01: real struggle that actually Central and Eastern European states had in order to convince the

01:19:06: existing NATO states at the time that they belonged in that exclusive alliance. Well,

01:19:11: they have really shown the value of having them in. They have shown they not only belong,

01:19:14: but can lead the way as Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently said. And frankly,

01:19:19: they are setting an example for a lot of the rest of the alliance and will be at the heart and

01:19:24: hopefully at the head of the European pillar that NATO truly needs if it is actually going to not

01:19:30: only survive but thrive going forward. Now, there is another very important aspect of this,

01:19:35: which is about self-determination, of course. And this is the difference between a sphere of

01:19:39: influence as empires like Russia would seek to have and a sphere of integration where countries

01:19:45: can collectively determine which alliances they would like to try and be part of. Now,

01:19:49: of course, they have to convince the others, but they have the right themselves to try and

01:19:53: understand for themselves which alliances to join. Now, of course, this is a key point that relates

01:19:58: also to colonialism and histories of empire. And we know that doesn't only pertain in Europe,

01:20:03: of course, it pertains all around the world. And it's a particularly big question when we talk

01:20:08: about relations with the global south, which is why I think it would be extremely interesting if

01:20:13: Prime Minister Kalas were to be appointed as high representative for the common foreign and security

01:20:17: policy. She would have a point of difference coming from a small country or smaller country. And

01:20:22: remember, it's the size of the fight in the dog, not the dog in the fight that counts in a lot of

01:20:27: these things. But coming from a smaller country that was indeed colonized and occupied rather

01:20:32: than coming from a former imperial nation, she would have a different point from which to launch

01:20:37: off discussions with the global south. So let's hear what she had to say about that issue.

01:20:42: I think we have a very good position. And that is that we have never colonized anybody. We don't

01:20:48: have that as small countries. So we are not suspected of really pushing forward our own

01:20:59: interests when we talk about these struggles. And I think that is our strength, what we have to

01:21:08: use, especially with the global south and countries all around the world to explain what is at stake

01:21:18: here. Yes, you know, Russia is working hard also to convince the countries from other parts of

01:21:33: the world to see the world how they are seeing this. We have to do the same.

01:21:39: So actually understanding this as a global struggle, one in which we all have interest

01:21:44: at stake, or at least certainly those who would wish to live in a democratic and free future,

01:21:49: wherever they reside, be that in the north, the south, the east or the west,

01:21:52: that is part of the key challenge that the new HRVP will actually have. And one point that

01:21:57: really stood out to me, Aaron, when we were in Tallinn, was echoing the words of the historian

01:22:04: Timothy Snyder in saying that we have to treat these different incidents of democracies under

01:22:09: attack of authoritarian aggression, not as individual isolated cases, but as part of a

01:22:15: wider connected phenomenon. Now, of course, that doesn't mean these things are all done

01:22:20: in coordination or they're all done in through some kind of conspiratorial mechanism. But what

01:22:25: they have in common is that they put democracy under threat and they put freedom under threat.

01:22:30: And so we need to present a clear, strong and united front against them. And one of the most

01:22:35: hot aspects of that front right now, of course, is in Ukraine. Exactly, Ben. And we've made the case

01:22:42: before here that Russia is already at war with us, not simply at war with Ukraine, but actually

01:22:49: with all of us. Ukraine is simply the flashpoint right now of that systemic struggle between

01:22:56: an authoritarian Russia and a democratic West. That's something that our Estonian hosts in Tallinn

01:23:03: certainly understand, something that the Prime Minister certainly makes a point of continuing

01:23:10: to stress. Here's what she had to say about this. What is important to understand is that

01:23:17: there are different tensions building up all across the world. And Azerbaijan, Armenia, for

01:23:28: example, Middle East, South China Sea. In 1938, I think a mistake was made to treat all these

01:23:39: kind of Italian invasion in Abyssinia, the German occupation and all these things,

01:23:47: Japan war, to treat them as isolated events. And I think we shouldn't do that now. So if you are

01:23:55: not afraid of the war reaching your country, then the overall peace of the world in different parts

01:24:06: should concern us all. But, yeah, Ukraine in defeat is definitely something that all the

01:24:15: aggressors would learn from that this pays off. You can just, in 2024 or 22, you can just bluntly go

01:24:24: and colonize part of another country and nothing happens to you. So you can do it.

01:24:31: So we are in a systemic competition. The Prime Minister made that point very clearly here.

01:24:35: But if we're going to win this competition, we need to be able to back it up with the necessary

01:24:41: resources. Not simply to help Ukraine win, but to step up our own deterrence, to step up our

01:24:49: own ability to be able to handle the geostrategic challenges of the future, which also are in the

01:24:55: Indo-Pacific as well. Prime Minister Callis laid out the measures she thinks Europe in particular

01:25:02: should consider to get from, as you often say, Ben, from should to did, how we actually build

01:25:11: that capacity. I also hope that other countries will follow suit because I think in European

01:25:19: level using the proceeds is already a good thing, first step. But eventually, all countries will

01:25:27: come to the place where the taxpayers will say that, you know, why should we pay for this?

01:25:32: We haven't caused the damages in Ukraine. And this is a very, very accurate question.

01:25:37: So I think we will get there eventually. Then, of course, on our own defense, we have to

01:25:48: strengthen the European defense and boost our defense industry. The big gap is capital, access

01:25:56: to capital regarding, you know, boosting defense. Good to see that the trajectory is going higher

01:26:03: and it reached 360 billion defence spending of countries last year, euros. Then it was

01:26:12: 360 billion euros last year. This is the level not seen since the Cold War. But it's still

01:26:20: not enough. I mean, only 18 countries are reaching 2 percent this year. And in 23 was 11 percent,

01:26:30: but still it's not 32 countries of NATO. And of course, closing the existing gaps in our

01:26:42: security and defence. That also means boosting the defense industry. And there, of course,

01:26:47: it is, we have proposed the Euro bonds. We are pushing this forward. France is supporting.

01:26:56: And we have some other countries also on board. We have some countries who are very much against

01:27:02: this. But, you know, we have done this when we really understand that we are in crisis. I mean,

01:27:09: in terms of COVID, everybody understood that, you know, we have to act fast. So we raise capital

01:27:14: together. And I think, you know, this illustrates that not only all countries understand that we

01:27:19: are in this crisis now, we have to act now. But we are working on that. We also did the defence

01:27:26: investment fund in order to put the seed money into the defence industry so that to open up the

01:27:36: capital of private funds as well. I also need to point out the shadow war that is going on

01:27:44: against our societies. So Russia is really wanting to sow fear in our societies and also

01:27:51: make us refrain from supporting Ukraine. We see different hybrid types of attacks in different

01:27:57: parts of the European Union. I think it would be a mistake to treat them in isolation. For example,

01:28:04: one intelligence office, they were telling that we are saying to another member state that, you

01:28:13: know, we see that Russians, they have plans to attack your warehouse. And then when there is a

01:28:23: fire in the warehouse, then the other country says that, oh, we are going to invest the fire and we

01:28:28: don't know it's Russians. Although the intelligence told them two weeks before that the Russians want

01:28:35: to attack this warehouse. So the point being that I feel that there is this innate understanding

01:28:45: or hope that it's not Russians. I think if we are treating these in isolation, then we don't

01:28:50: understand how serious the situation really is. And Aaron, I'm sure you were as glad as I to see

01:28:58: that in fact, since Prime Minister Kala spoke, the number of countries meeting that 2% target has

01:29:03: in fact risen. The NATO figures that have been announced ahead of the Washington summit show

01:29:07: that now 20 of the Alliance members are meeting that target. But don't forget that target is a

01:29:12: flaw, not a ceiling. And it also depends what you get for your money there that will determine the

01:29:18: capabilities which really actually are what we need to be focusing on. 2% is good political

01:29:23: shorthand, 2.5% would be better. And I think we can expect to see an increase in that flaw at some

01:29:30: point in the next couple of years, perhaps even already from the Washington summit, let's see.

01:29:34: But it depends on those capabilities that we need. And that's where the EU has to get its act together

01:29:40: and work together with NATO in order to help boost the defense industrial base in Europe and to make

01:29:46: sure that we're procuring the strategic enablers, the strategic strike capability, the military

01:29:51: mobility assets that we need in order to actually be able to bear the bulk of conventional deterrence

01:29:57: responsibility in Europe ourselves. Now, that's something that it wouldn't matter whether Donald

01:30:03: Trump were elected again, were elected again, or Joe Biden gets a second term. It's something that

01:30:07: would be welcomed across the board in Washington. And frankly, I think it's the only thing that

01:30:12: will actually really keep NATO together in the long term is if we see that real burden shifting

01:30:17: the creation of a true European pillar of NATO. And unsurprisingly, Kaya Kalas was also rather

01:30:25: clear about that. We are not voting in American elections. So we have to work with every leader

01:30:30: that the Americans are choosing for themselves. Last time when Trump was president, then all the

01:30:38: allies actually invested more in defense. And that was a good thing on the European level. But I think

01:30:46: still, I mean, we shouldn't be worrying or worrying about, you know, leaders of different

01:30:55: countries, but thinking what we can do ourselves as Europe, you know, in spite of who is the

01:31:04: president of the United States. And that means that we have to invest more in our defense.

01:31:08: Everybody, all the allies who have also had the defense investment pledge, and we have to boost

01:31:15: our defense industry. We have to make sure that all these things are interoperable,

01:31:20: that we do the exercises together, and all these things that we are trying to do here,

01:31:27: that we would actually be able to defend NATO, I mean, here, if the threat is here.

01:31:38: And so talking about then the possibility of a Donald Trump victory,

01:31:43: or indeed a Joe Biden victory, brings us to thinking about how we need to actually fix

01:31:48: our own roof in order to make sure that we have the democracies that are worth defending,

01:31:53: that live up to their promise at home to our citizens, that enough of our people are actually

01:31:59: satisfied with our system to buy into it, and to therefore create the truly resilient societies

01:32:04: that we will need to win this systemic competition. And this is something that was very much understood

01:32:09: during the Cold War. It was something that leaders around Europe and the US, even Richard Nixon,

01:32:15: understood this interestingly, addressing a group of NATO leaders in 1973, he talked about the

01:32:20: welfare state and the importance of the welfare state, and social housing provision, and so on.

01:32:25: Because what Nixon and also every other leader, I think, in that NATO grouping realized,

01:32:30: was that our systemic competition, our war, is on two fronts. One is international,

01:32:35: and for that we need the diplomatic, military, and security means as well as the right attitude

01:32:41: in order to win it. But we have to win it at home as well. And we have to head off the threats to

01:32:46: our democracy at home. And that means really giving our people that credible sense of a better future.

01:32:52: It means increasing political participation, and perhaps a different political economic model too.

01:32:57: And that's all things that we are going to be talking about on the small little PS

01:33:02: to season two of Berlin Side Out that we've got planned for next week, isn't it, Aaron?

01:33:06: Absolutely. I'm looking forward to it. And we will also have much more details on what's next for

01:33:13: Berlin Side Out, as well as for us and our work on how we get to that strategic capacity building,

01:33:23: how we actually achieve those objectives necessary to be able to secure our societies,

01:33:30: but also ensure that, as we've often said on this podcast before, our societies remain worth

01:33:36: defending, that they are prosperous societies, that they are open societies, that we also win

01:33:45: on that second front that you've been talking about then, not simply the military, but also the

01:33:49: societal. So that's all for this special bonus edition of Berlin Side Out, partly recorded in

01:33:55: Tallinn. Thanks very much indeed to all of our guests who were joining us at the Leonard Mary

01:34:00: conference, which was a terrific conference. And congratulations to Helga Kalman, the organizing

01:34:05: team from ICDS there in Tallinn, who made it such an intellectually stimulating as well as a very

01:34:10: enjoyable experience for us all. Thank you very much indeed to Estonian Prime Minister Kaya Kallas

01:34:16: for her time when she was speaking with the international media, including us at Berlin

01:34:19: Side Out. Thank you to our project assistant Julian Stofler, our technical producer, Hendrik

01:34:24: Werner and the DGAP team who made Berlin Side Out season two possible. And stay tuned for some

01:34:30: exciting news about our third season, as well as details about the Democratic Strategy Initiative,

01:34:35: which will look at how we get from reactive site and vendor to proactive strategy that marshals

01:34:40: our resources to win the systemic competition. You can find links in our show notes, links to our

01:34:45: guests and to some readings, but for now though, I'll be the same and tschüss!