28 – Germany’s Nuclear Fear: Deterrence, Escalation, Nuclear and Other Threats

00:00:00: Welcome to Berlin Side Out, the podcast that takes an expert look at how Germany sees the

00:00:05: world and the world sees Germany.

00:00:07: With me, Benjamin Tallis.

00:00:09: And me, Aaron Gash-Bernett.

00:00:12: Hello, and welcome back to Berlin Side Out, the Foreign Affairs Podcast in association

00:00:20: with the German Council on Foreign Relations that takes an expert look at how Germany sees

00:00:25: the world and the world sees Germany.

00:00:27: I'm Aaron Gash-Bernett, a journalist and foreign policy analyst, and I'm here with

00:00:31: my friend and co-host, Benjamin Tallis, senior research fellow here at the Council and head

00:00:36: of its Action Group, Seitan Wende.

00:00:37: Now, Ben, today we're really getting into an existential theme, the nuclear question.

00:00:42: And it's a topic we've touched on before in Berlin Side Out, mostly because despite Russia's

00:00:48: war in Ukraine being a conventional war, the nuclear dimension is always there.

00:00:54: Senator Olaf Scholz has used the German public's fear of nuclear war to present himself as a

00:00:59: cautious decision maker who is trying to prevent this war from escalating into a nuclear conflict.

00:01:05: This he reasoned was legitimate grounds for not sending tourist cruise missiles.

00:01:10: It was also part of why he was so hesitant to send leopard tanks before the U.S. agreed

00:01:14: to send Abrams tanks.

00:01:16: Kainan-Alein-Gange or no going at loan really means not without the American nuclear guarantee.

00:01:23: That's one part of the story, but is that all of it, Ben?

00:01:28: How much is the nuclear dimension really at play here in some of these decisions by Scholz,

00:01:34: do you think?

00:01:35: Well, I think it's certainly in play as a reason sometimes, but more often as an excuse

00:01:40: and an excuse not to act, not to step up and actually face down the Russian threat.

00:01:44: And this is an excuse born of a willful ignorance of how deterrence actually works and in fact

00:01:49: a willful forgetting of the role that Germany played so well as a frontline state during

00:01:54: the Cold War when both the German people and their leaders, like those of other NATO allies,

00:02:00: understood both defense and deterrence rather better than they do now.

00:02:04: And that's what we're here to try and address through the whole series, but also particularly

00:02:08: on this episode to understand how Germany can go about relocating its geostrategic compass,

00:02:14: including by raising its deterrence and nuclear IQ.

00:02:18: And by doing that, Germany can play a fuller role in the defense of security, prosperity

00:02:23: and freedom in Europe, can be a better NATO ally.

00:02:26: And honestly, it needs to because some of the discussions that we've been having in

00:02:30: recent weeks at some of the leading security conferences around Europe with policymakers

00:02:35: as well as policy shapers and experts shows that Germany is really losing credibility

00:02:39: fast.

00:02:40: The discussion as well as the action on the ground is moving on without Germany.

00:02:44: The pace of geopolitical events is faster than that of the so-called new German speed.

00:02:49: And so while Germany still deliberate, deliberates and hesitates, others are actually stepping

00:02:54: up and stepping forward.

00:02:56: Now that's an important thing for Germans to realize because they need to have a clearer

00:03:00: input on the direction in which that's going because they have a stake in the outcome.

00:03:05: Their security, prosperity and freedom are at stake here as well.

00:03:09: And so in order to actually play that shaping role, that crucial role that we know Germany

00:03:13: could play, much as it did during the Cold War, we need to address this failing of understanding

00:03:19: and failure of willpower from German politicians.

00:03:22: And of course, we have to consider the flip side as well.

00:03:25: If Germany doesn't get its strategic act together and doesn't start actually coming

00:03:29: to a better posture that reflects the realities of deterrence rather than just simply the horror

00:03:34: of the potential consequences of nuclear war.

00:03:37: And so actually explores what needs to be done in order to make our deterrence credible.

00:03:41: And it not only faces a loss of credibility, Germany is of course in range of Russian missiles

00:03:46: and would present itself as a tempting target for coercion, but also potentially for actual

00:03:52: attack.

00:03:53: And that's something that Germans need to be very clear about in which currently some

00:03:56: of their politicians are not being sufficiently honest with them about.

00:04:00: And so this seemingly risk averse strategy that's often put forward is actually extremely

00:04:05: risky for Germany.

00:04:06: And again, we're here to address that today with the experts we're going to be talking

00:04:09: through who give a real guide as to what you need to know to understand nuclear deterrence

00:04:15: and to understand deterrence more widely and how it fits into the security situation and

00:04:20: the kind of geopolitics that we've been talking about on the first two seasons of Berlin's

00:04:24: Side Out.

00:04:26: And we've got some great guests today to help us get into both Putin's nuclear blackmail

00:04:30: and how successful it is in deterring the leader like Olaf Schulz.

00:04:34: But before we go to them, a quick overview.

00:04:36: The world has nine nuclear nations possessing about 12,500 nuclear weapons between them.

00:04:42: All five permanent UN Security Council members have them plus Pakistan, India, Israel and

00:04:46: North Korea.

00:04:48: Russia and the US have the lion's share of these at over 5000 each.

00:04:52: Five countries including Germany host American nuclear weapons as part of NATO.

00:04:58: With that background in, let's bring in our first guest today, Fabian Hoffman.

00:05:03: Hoffman is a doctoral research fellow at the Oslo nuclear project hosted by the University

00:05:08: of Oslo.

00:05:09: Now, Fabian, let's talk first about a recent tweet by Chancellor Olaf Schulz reacting to

00:05:15: Russia's announced nuclear step up where Schulz said in English, "It is always important

00:05:22: to make clear that nuclear weapons must not be used in this war."

00:05:26: And this tweet left you a little lost for words at first.

00:05:30: So Fabian, welcome to the show.

00:05:32: What do you make of that Schulz tweet now and the kind of message it sends about how

00:05:37: Schulz understands nuclear issues?

00:05:40: Yeah, great to be here.

00:05:42: So basically the issue with the tweet is that it acknowledges the nuclear threat made by

00:05:50: Putin.

00:05:51: It basically signals to the world that Germany, the Schulz, the government is really concerned

00:05:58: about what is going on in the nuclear domain and these nuclear threats made by Russia.

00:06:03: But at the same time, it does not address the core issue.

00:06:07: And that is that we are threatened by a nuclear power.

00:06:12: The response is signaling risk aversion.

00:06:14: It is signaling pain and tolerance.

00:06:17: So basically, Schulz is giving Putin everything that he's asked for with the nuclear threat.

00:06:25: And that's of course really bad.

00:06:27: So I think either you simply ignore the message that comes from Moscow, don't even react to

00:06:32: it or if you decide to react to it, then you have to provide a forceful response where

00:06:38: you try to make clear to your opposite that you will not be threatened, you will not be

00:06:43: quiesced, but this weird middle way that Schulz has chosen, that's really disadvantageous

00:06:48: to the government, to Germany and to NATO.

00:06:51: Exactly.

00:06:52: It has the effect of sowing more fear without giving the impression we know what to do about

00:06:56: it.

00:06:57: This is really, as you say, the worst of all possible worlds.

00:07:00: And to me and many others, and you made your feelings about this clear too, Fabian, many

00:07:05: times on Twitter and elsewhere, it really epitomizes the low level of nuclear understanding,

00:07:12: deterrence discourse, and deterrence knowledge in the German public and political debate.

00:07:16: So given that low level of knowledge and a low level of discourse, what would you do

00:07:20: to improve it?

00:07:21: What do the German and their leaders need to know about nuclear deterrence and how it

00:07:25: works?

00:07:26: Yes, I think one of the core issues that we have in Germany and one thing that our decision

00:07:32: makers do not fully understand when it comes to nuclear decision making is the role of

00:07:37: risk taking.

00:07:39: Right now, NATO is in what we would call in academic literature a risk taking competition

00:07:45: with Russia.

00:07:47: There is a nuclear threat, there is a nuclear risk over what is going on in Ukraine.

00:07:54: And right now, we have to make sure that we can support Ukraine and we keep supporting

00:07:59: Ukraine without this thing escalating to a nuclear level.

00:08:04: And in order to do that, you have to make sure that there is a level of nuclear deterrence

00:08:09: where Russia understands that them resorting to nuclear use will not be beneficial, will

00:08:16: not be advantageous to their objectives.

00:08:19: And here is the fundamental paradox of the nuclear age probably.

00:08:23: In order to effectively deter nuclear use of the adversary, you have to make clear to

00:08:28: the adversary in a credible way that if push comes to shove, you are willing to do what

00:08:35: is necessary to defeat the adversary even on the nuclear level.

00:08:39: So basically, I have to threaten nuclear use in order to deter nuclear use by the adversary.

00:08:45: And that is something that was fundamentally understood during the Cold War.

00:08:50: That doesn't mean that we are running around and constantly calling for nuclear weapons

00:08:55: to be used in our adversaries.

00:08:57: But we try to make clear to our opponents or the United States in particular to the Soviet

00:09:04: Union that if push comes to shove, the United States is absolutely willing to employ nuclear

00:09:09: weapons over what is going on in Europe.

00:09:13: And so basically what this means is you have to accept a certain level of risk.

00:09:19: Without doing that, it will be really, really difficult for Germany, for NATO, for Ukraine

00:09:26: to get out of this.

00:09:27: Because if we don't do this, we make ourselves susceptible to nuclear cohesion.

00:09:33: And this is exactly what Putin wants.

00:09:35: Right.

00:09:36: And the paradox you're getting at there is that by supposedly accepting no risk, you

00:09:40: actually make yourself less safe.

00:09:41: Yeah, exactly.

00:09:42: And I would say that not accepting any risk is even the riskier or is actually the riskier

00:09:48: strategy because you make yourself open to the type of nuclear cohesion that Putin threatens

00:09:55: us with.

00:09:56: This is a problem with the whole way this discourse is framed in the German debate in

00:10:00: particular because the threats are all coming publicly from one side.

00:10:04: The saber rattling, the nuclear saber rattling is coming from the Kremlin and from Putin's

00:10:08: outriders in the Russian media, Medvedev and others.

00:10:12: But we have nuclear weapons too.

00:10:14: And exactly what you mentioned before, call it mutually assured destruction, call it

00:10:18: new, new curse will nuke you back in very, very simple basic terms.

00:10:22: There is a balance there.

00:10:23: And that's not something that we see understood or discussed properly.

00:10:26: Instead, we're seeing fear on one side only.

00:10:29: Why do you think that is?

00:10:30: There is an asymmetry in terms of the risks that either side is willing to accept.

00:10:37: And there's also an asymmetry in terms of the perceived pain intolerance or pain tolerance

00:10:44: on both sides.

00:10:45: Russia has made clear, including through its military strategies on the battlefield in

00:10:51: Ukraine, that it is absolutely willing to accept huge numbers of casualties.

00:10:56: At the same time, some of the strategies are simply the fact that it has been willing to

00:11:02: go to this length and invade a country like Ukraine in the first place also tells us something

00:11:06: about the risk willingness of Russia.

00:11:10: And basically in order to counter that, we have to tell Russia that yes, we are also

00:11:16: able and willing to take risks.

00:11:19: And then you're looking again at our decision makers in Berlin and other European capitals,

00:11:23: and what we're signaling is the complete opposite.

00:11:26: So let's talk about that for a minute.

00:11:27: A lot of Schultz's red lines, these kinds of self-imposed red lines, have a nuclear dimension.

00:11:36: And this is quite clear.

00:11:38: He presents himself as being this careful statesman of sorts that is doing everything

00:11:44: he possibly can to shield the German public from risk, particularly nuclear risk.

00:11:49: This is definitely something that plays into the chancellor's thinking around the decision

00:11:54: not to send tourists, for example, or even to wait until the US agreed to send Abrams

00:12:02: tanks in order to be able to send leopards.

00:12:04: A lot of this really did seem to have a nuclear dimension.

00:12:09: And the whole phrase "Kaina Alangeng" and "never alone" that was used around leopards

00:12:16: really seemed to suggest that, no, not without the nuclear guarantee and specifically the

00:12:22: US nuclear guarantee.

00:12:25: Will we do anything?

00:12:27: In the end, it is about escalation.

00:12:30: So the chancellor is afraid that by delivering tourists, for example, that this might trigger

00:12:38: escalation with Russia and NATO and then also Germany being drawn into the war.

00:12:45: And that, of course, is so potentially catastrophic in the minds of Schultz and others because

00:12:52: escalation then also immediately has this nuclear dimension.

00:12:57: The chore, the fighting might start on a conventional level.

00:13:00: NATO and Russia might not immediately confront each other with nuclear weapons, but once

00:13:04: the fighting has started, there is a chance that the war will escalate and nuclear weapons

00:13:10: will eventually be employed.

00:13:12: But he's so transparent about this as well.

00:13:14: He's so transparent about what will deter him.

00:13:17: One thing that I give to the opponents of tourist deliveries is that even though I believe

00:13:25: that nuclear escalation or any type of escalation where NATO is directly drawn into the war

00:13:32: over tourist deliveries or the delivery of any other single weapon system, it's really,

00:13:37: really low.

00:13:38: It's minuscule, but it's not zero.

00:13:40: There is a non-zero chance, the chore, that if we use or deliver a certain weapon system

00:13:47: to Ukraine that this might cross some perceived threshold, some red line inside the Kremlin.

00:13:55: So again, and I think this is really something we have to emphasize, the risks for that are

00:13:59: extremely low, not least because nuclear weapons used by Russia would also impose tremendous

00:14:06: risks on the decision makers in the Kremlin.

00:14:11: The political, economic, military risks that come together with nuclear use, they're really,

00:14:18: really high.

00:14:19: So overall, I believe that the chances of nuclear escalation or any type of escalation

00:14:25: are really low.

00:14:26: Yes, they're not zero, but this is again where the role of risks comes in again because

00:14:32: the probabilities are not zero.

00:14:35: You have to be willing to accept this certain amount of risk that comes with decision making.

00:14:41: That is natural and that is necessary.

00:14:44: And that is unfortunately what Charles is not willing to do.

00:14:46: No, indeed.

00:14:47: And it's also shows an either unwillingness or an inability to calculate competing risks

00:14:52: against each other.

00:14:53: While being unwilling to accept any risk seemingly there, which we've said it's already actually

00:14:57: a more risky option, what that puts you at greater risk of is coercion of all sorts of

00:15:03: different kinds.

00:15:04: And those two things that you've mentioned there, Fabian, fear and signaling fear and

00:15:09: signaling pain aversion that you're not willing to take any pain at all, make you extremely

00:15:13: susceptible to potential coercion.

00:15:16: And this was the fear of NATO throughout the Cold War, of course, that actually the Russians

00:15:20: would be able to win without firing a shot because the threat of force would be enough

00:15:26: to actually pick off the Europeans one by one because they'd effectively go soft because

00:15:31: they didn't want to bear any of this potential pain.

00:15:34: So why haven't we learned those lessons from the Cold War?

00:15:36: That's a great question.

00:15:37: I think we learned those lessons.

00:15:39: I think they just largely got forgotten or we now have decision makers in place that

00:15:45: either don't want to listen to history or just have never learned them.

00:15:49: I mean, you are absolutely right.

00:15:51: During the Cold War, the challenge that NATO faced was not to convince the Soviet Union

00:15:57: that it had the means to completely annihilate the territory.

00:16:02: The real challenge was convincing the Russians that the United States was willing to go to

00:16:09: these great lengths to employ nuclear weapons over issues on the European continent.

00:16:16: That was the core issue and the United States went to enormous lengths to reassure its European

00:16:22: allies that it would indeed intervene in any conflict with the Soviet Union, even if that

00:16:29: meant that it had to accept enormous nuclear risks.

00:16:33: And this is, for example, why we had American brigades in West Berlin and all over Western

00:16:39: Germany.

00:16:40: I mean, in the end, especially the one in West Berlin, that brigade wasn't there to

00:16:45: hold off the Soviet Union.

00:16:46: They were there to die.

00:16:48: And they were to die because it means that the United States is immediately drawn into

00:16:52: the conflict.

00:16:53: And that tells the Soviet Union that also for them the risk of nuclear escalation are

00:16:57: eventually really, really high.

00:17:00: So again, I think the decision makers during the Cold War, they either understood that

00:17:04: intuitively or they had to learn that really, really fast.

00:17:07: And then after the 1990s, we had this beautiful time with the peace dividend where we almost

00:17:12: forgot about nuclear weapons.

00:17:15: And now, painstakingly, I think we have to relearn those lessons.

00:17:18: And unfortunately, we also just live in an era, I think, where a lot of decision makers

00:17:24: just, they fundamentally don't understand the condition of living with existential risk

00:17:31: anymore, at least in Western Europe.

00:17:34: This is totally different for those living in Poland or the Baltics.

00:17:38: They fully understand that the stakes are existential.

00:17:41: But in France, the UK, especially Germany, unlike during the Cold War, where the risks

00:17:46: were truly existential, this is no longer the case, at least immediately, for Germany.

00:17:52: I think that's one of the big problems.

00:17:54: Right.

00:17:55: And it also seems a bit uncivilized, I think, to some people today, who rather have the feeling

00:17:59: that we've condemned war and all of this nasty business of thinking through killing

00:18:02: each other to the past and us now, our civilized folk who've moved on from that, they don't

00:18:08: want to think about a brigade of soldiers being sent somewhere to die, or more specifically,

00:18:13: to be willing to die in order that no one has to die.

00:18:16: And that's the point of that, that isn't really thought through.

00:18:19: Because the first part of the calculation is so abhorrent to some contemporary sensibilities,

00:18:25: the thinking about it stops there.

00:18:27: This must be a terrible idea.

00:18:29: And that's, I think, where we get stuck, because we don't go further in that, and therefore

00:18:32: the risk calculation and so on is not actually made properly.

00:18:36: The US, during the Cold War, demonstrated that it was willing to use nuclear weapons

00:18:44: due to issues that might happen on the European continent, that this was a level of risk,

00:18:49: that it was willing to accept.

00:18:53: But then if we look back to Olaf Schultz's decisions as we were talking a moment ago,

00:18:58: he never seems to take any decisions unless he has American cover.

00:19:02: Because there is that nuclear guarantee that comes implicit with any contribution that

00:19:09: comes from the United States.

00:19:11: But are we missing, is he missing the factor perhaps not trusting that the French and the

00:19:15: UK, who are also fellow NATO members, also have their own nuclear deterrence, and have

00:19:20: acted quite a bit ahead of the Germans when it comes to delivering anything from storm

00:19:27: shadow missiles, for example.

00:19:28: Is it that Olaf Schultz just simply doesn't trust the fact that there is a European pillar

00:19:35: to NATO, including on nuclear issues?

00:19:38: Or is it also perhaps that we simply have not discussed the European dimension of extended

00:19:45: deterrence nearly enough?

00:19:46: Or is it both?

00:19:47: What do you think?

00:19:48: That's a really interesting question, to be honest, especially in regard to the French

00:19:53: nuclear deterrence.

00:19:57: It's interesting because if we think about existential threats that Germany could face

00:20:05: in a war, the moment, let's say, Russia invades and they get increasingly close to Berlin

00:20:13: and other German population centers, and threats become existential for Germany, I think you

00:20:19: would have a really hard time making the argument that these same threats are not also existential

00:20:26: on some level to France, which means that at that moment French nuclear use might be

00:20:34: warranted.

00:20:35: I think in that sense there is a real deterrence purpose behind the French nuclear deterrent

00:20:43: also for Germany.

00:20:46: I as a German in that sense, I feel quite secured by the French nuclear arsenal.

00:20:53: I think it plays a huge role in the European deterrence architecture and then the same,

00:20:59: of course, also counts for the United Kingdom.

00:21:03: And then, right, why is there such a perceived asymmetry where Schultz apparently always

00:21:09: looks to the United States and not also to European allies or allies on the European

00:21:16: continent with nuclear weapons?

00:21:18: I think it would be difficult to fully reduce that to the nuclear arsenal, although I believe

00:21:23: that in Schultz's mind, I think there's a good chance that the American nuclear arsenal

00:21:28: is a lot more present than the French and the British nuclear arsenals.

00:21:32: But I think it's also the overall conventional and economic might that stands behind the

00:21:37: United States.

00:21:39: And this is what Schultz is looking at and this is what he wants for him to back him

00:21:46: up in his decision making.

00:21:48: Other countries in Europe, as you mentioned, have different risk calculations and who deal

00:21:51: with fear differently have also taken a different approach, as Aaron mentioned, to weapons deliveries

00:21:57: to Ukraine, but also to thinking about their own deterrence.

00:22:01: And one country that stood out in that regard is Poland, which is making noises that it

00:22:07: wants to participate in NATO nuclear sharing.

00:22:09: So Aaron mentioned before, there are five countries currently that host US nuclear bombs,

00:22:15: G61 gravity bombs, and Poland wants a piece of that action too.

00:22:20: It has the F-35s coming in that could actually perform that role, same thing as for Germany

00:22:24: and for several of the other partners.

00:22:27: Why is Poland seeking to do that?

00:22:29: And would that actually be enough or should Poland be seeking its own nuclear deterrent

00:22:33: actually?

00:22:34: I mean, Poland, I think, is doing it because they see how the European security architecture

00:22:41: has changed in the last couple of years and they perceive a very clear existential threat.

00:22:46: And they believe that under certain circumstances, their conventional capabilities may not be

00:22:52: enough to fully deter Russia, or at least they believe that their overall deterrent could

00:22:57: be propped up by a nuclear arsenal in whatever form.

00:23:04: And you're correct, the Poles have asked NATO and especially the United States to provide

00:23:11: a forward deployed nuclear deterrent similar to the deterrent's arrangement with Germany

00:23:16: and Italy, for example.

00:23:18: And so far, NATO has rejected that.

00:23:22: So they are not yet willing to deploy forward deployed nuclear weapons to Poland.

00:23:27: And that means that if Poland is serious about deploying a nuclear capability, the only option

00:23:35: would be to deploy an independent nuclear deterrent.

00:23:40: That of course comes with tremendous risks also for Polish decision makers, right?

00:23:45: If Poland were to go down that route.

00:23:47: I mean, I think at least in the short term that would undermine crisis stability in the

00:23:51: sense that it would, at least it would provide incentives for Russia to challenge Poland sooner

00:24:00: than later before it deploys a nuclear arsenal.

00:24:02: But then if you think maybe in the medium to long term, I think there are a couple of

00:24:06: states, especially in Eastern Europe, especially the Baltics and Romania, for example, that

00:24:11: might actually appreciate an independent nuclear deterrent in an Eastern European country.

00:24:16: So I don't think that this is a decision that is taken lightly, likely.

00:24:20: No, no, no, I'm out of it.

00:24:25: Okay.

00:24:26: Okay.

00:24:29: I don't think that this is a decision that is taken lightly by Polish decision makers

00:24:35: at all.

00:24:36: Obviously, it is very complex.

00:24:38: I don't think that right now Poland is on the verge of taking that decision of building,

00:24:44: manufacturing, developing an independent nuclear deterrent, but it's definitely also not something

00:24:50: that we should completely ignore, at least when we're looking at what Polish decision

00:24:56: makers are signaling to us right now in this regard.

00:24:59: Fabian, perhaps just for the benefit of our listeners, you could also talk us through

00:25:03: a little bit what this phrase "independent nuclear deterrent" means, because technically

00:25:07: France has an independent nuclear deterrent, whereas the UK's nuclear forces are not independent

00:25:12: as such.

00:25:14: So what are the differences there?

00:25:16: Some of that really depends a bit on how you define it.

00:25:19: I would say by and large, the British also deploy an independent nuclear deterrent in

00:25:24: the sense that the final decision making over nuclear weapons use rests solely with British

00:25:32: authorities.

00:25:33: That's of course also the case with France, where the two arsenals maybe differ slightly

00:25:39: is that the British nuclear arsenal is very dependent on technology transfers from the

00:25:46: United States.

00:25:48: For example, it's ballistic missile submarine fleet, the technology for that, so submarine

00:25:56: launch ballistic missiles essentially.

00:25:58: A lot of technology comes from the United States and actually the UK has faced tremendous

00:26:04: difficulties in reshoring some of that competence to build and manufacture its own nuclear deterrent.

00:26:15: For France, that's very different.

00:26:17: They have maintained also a highly independent nuclear arsenal in that regard, so they are

00:26:22: fully capable, as far as we know, of manufacturing their ballistic missiles, the warheads, that

00:26:28: the cruise missiles that they may use for these task and purposes.

00:26:31: Indeed, strategic economic sovereignty for their nuclear force, as if we combine several

00:26:36: of Emmanuel Macron's to various different concepts that have come out over the last

00:26:41: few years.

00:26:42: Strategic nuclear autonomy.

00:26:44: Macron, medley indeed.

00:26:46: Right, let me just talk to you quickly then, Fabian, about the weapons actually involved,

00:26:51: because now we've heard about the nuclear sharing, which involves the gravity bombs, and you've

00:26:56: just mentioned the submarine launch ballistic missiles.

00:27:00: In serious terms, what value do those gravity bombs have?

00:27:03: Where does the main nuclear deterrent value come from?

00:27:06: What kind of weapons are we talking about when we talk nuclear?

00:27:09: And also below the nuclear threshold, what are the main weapons that we need to know

00:27:13: about when it comes to our deterrents?

00:27:15: Probably, we can make a broad distinction between strategic nuclear weapons and non-strategic

00:27:20: nuclear weapons.

00:27:21: Basically, I mean, they're different terms for it, right?

00:27:24: I don't like the term tactical nuclear weapon, because I think it is a bit too deterministic

00:27:30: in what it implies about usage and what it looks like.

00:27:35: So basically, strategic nuclear weapons, those are the really large yield warheads that if

00:27:41: push comes to shove, you would launch against the adversaries' population centers.

00:27:48: Or alternatively, if you believe, you can disarm the adversary outright.

00:27:54: Prior to him launching his nuclear arsenal, you might also want to employ these weapon

00:27:58: systems against the adversaries' nuclear forces.

00:28:01: So often you find these really large strategic nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, also

00:28:10: on long-range ballistic missiles or intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, the ones that you can shoot

00:28:16: all around the world.

00:28:17: Basically, you can pretty much land anywhere and threaten any target.

00:28:21: But you might also find them in the form of gravity bombs or also on cruise missiles.

00:28:28: So it's really just about where you would want to deploy those warheads on what types

00:28:32: of capabilities.

00:28:34: And then you have other types of nuclear weapons.

00:28:36: We refer to them sometimes as non-strategic nuclear weapons, sometimes also as tactical

00:28:40: nuclear weapons.

00:28:43: And usually the difference is that you want to use them for different tasks and purposes.

00:28:50: So for example, a non-strategic nuclear warhead might be beneficial to achieve battlefield

00:28:56: effect where I want to be somewhat discriminatory.

00:28:59: So for example, with a one-megaton nuclear warhead, which if I'm not incorrect right

00:29:06: now is the equivalent of 1 million tons of TNT, it might be really difficult to achieve

00:29:14: discriminatory effects on the battlefield.

00:29:17: So I might want to choose a lower-yield nuclear warhead somewhere around 10 to 20 kilotons,

00:29:24: for example.

00:29:25: I might also want to employ a non-strategic nuclear warhead purely for signal-aid purposes.

00:29:30: This is, for example, one of the scenarios that we might be a bit concerned about when

00:29:34: it comes to Russia, that at one point they could launch a nuclear warhead or detonate

00:29:39: a nuclear warhead over an unpopulated area or territory simply to signal to NATO and

00:29:45: the world that certain thresholds have been crossed and that nuclear weapons use has become

00:29:51: feasible.

00:29:53: So I think by and large this is the nuclear arsenal that we're dealing with on the side

00:29:58: of NATO, but then also on Russia's side.

00:30:02: There are other capabilities, also what we might refer to as strategic-level capabilities.

00:30:06: And I think a really big role here play long-range strike weapons.

00:30:10: So for example, I think when it comes to Russian nuclear use, one way to deter that is not

00:30:16: necessarily that we as NATO say that, if you nuke us or if you nuke Ukraine, we're going

00:30:22: to nuke you back.

00:30:23: I mean, one basic issue with that is that it might not be necessarily very credible and

00:30:28: Russia might not believe us.

00:30:30: So another option that we might have is simply to threaten retaliation with large-scale conventional

00:30:36: missile attacks.

00:30:37: And this is an area where NATO has tremendous capability, tremendous strength.

00:30:43: And I think that is a very credible threat towards Russia and one that they take very,

00:30:47: very seriously.

00:30:48: So let's say if they attack a target in Ukraine with nuclear weapons that we launch hundreds

00:30:54: of cruise missiles, conventionally armed cruise missiles against them.

00:30:58: Now Fabian, you mentioned that NATO has huge capability in that, but the US has huge capability

00:31:03: in that.

00:31:04: Right?

00:31:05: And so this is also where we get into a bit of a tricky situation if the US guarantee to

00:31:08: Europe is not there.

00:31:10: Absolutely.

00:31:11: I would say a lot of these contingency plans, what are we going to do if Russia goes nuclear?

00:31:17: They rely on both the US nuclear arsenal, but especially the US conventional arsenal.

00:31:23: So if we were to lack that arsenal and our response planning, I mean, that would be a

00:31:30: tremendous hit to NATO's overall capability.

00:31:33: And that for sure is concerning.

00:31:35: So Fabian, every public has a fear of nuclear war, which is understandable.

00:31:40: But nuclear fear seems especially acute in Germany.

00:31:44: And we have seen Olaf Scholz play to that fear as justification for not taking key decisions

00:31:50: to support Ukraine as we've discussed before.

00:31:54: Is that perhaps because of something that you were saying before, a difference in what

00:32:01: Germans consider to be existential?

00:32:04: So for example, for the Baltics and the Poles, a Russian invasion by conventional means,

00:32:10: not even going up to the nuclear level is already existential.

00:32:15: But for Germans, they can't really necessarily imagine a conventional invasion by Russia.

00:32:22: There's several other countries in the way first.

00:32:25: Is that one of the reasons why the nuclear question hangs over the German public so much,

00:32:29: do you think?

00:32:30: Yeah, absolutely.

00:32:31: I would definitely say so.

00:32:32: I mean, first of all, nuclear weapons, they are absolutely terrifying capabilities.

00:32:39: And we should fault absolutely no one for being afraid of the prospect of nuclear war.

00:32:45: I think it would be strange if we were not at least deeply concerned about it.

00:32:52: But then again, I think this demands, especially because that's the case, especially because

00:32:59: we might get clouded by a fear in this regard.

00:33:02: That demands a rational response from our decision makers that might be able to look

00:33:09: beyond the immediate consequences of nuclear use and might be able to look at the broader

00:33:18: elements of nuclear strategy.

00:33:21: And I think that's what we're lacking in Europe in general and especially in Germany.

00:33:27: Do you think that Germans underpriced that risk of non-nuclear strategic threat to their

00:33:36: country from the Russian long range missile strike complex?

00:33:40: Yeah, probably.

00:33:41: I mean, I think a lot of Germans don't fully understand that with nuclear weapons or not,

00:33:47: we are already in range of Russian missile capabilities.

00:33:51: And there is a very clear threat that if Russia at one point decides that they want to escalate

00:33:58: the war or that they have to escalate the war for whatever reason, and they have the

00:34:02: capability to do so, if we don't convince them that it would not be in their favor,

00:34:06: Germany is fully in range of what Russia refers to as its non-nuclear strategic arsenal, including

00:34:13: short range, conventionally armed ballistic missiles and then also cruise missile capabilities.

00:34:19: And Russian doctrine very clearly outlines that in specific phases of conflict, these

00:34:25: weapon systems would be used against the critical civilian infrastructure of the adversary.

00:34:31: And I think this is something that in Germany we have to recognize.

00:34:37: Again, don't let this cloud your judgment by fear, but be rational about it, but also

00:34:43: be aware that this is something that is a concrete threat.

00:34:48: Lenegren also understand that there are things that we can do about it.

00:34:51: We can build up denial capabilities like missile defense, like a counter-strike capability.

00:34:56: And most importantly, we have to make sure that right now we convince Russia that any

00:35:02: such escalation would not be in its own interest.

00:35:05: And we do that by signaling strength to Russia, not weakness.

00:35:09: Well, exactly so.

00:35:10: It's been all that to have the capabilities, but also the attitude that makes Putin and

00:35:14: his crew think, "Hmm, not today."

00:35:16: So Fabian Hoffman, thank you so much for joining us today.

00:35:19: That's been great to talk to you about these issues.

00:35:22: You can find Fabian, of course, on Twitter and you can find some of his publications

00:35:26: in our show notes.

00:35:28: Fabian Hoffman from Berlin to Oslo.

00:35:30: Have a wonderful evening.

00:35:32: Thanks very much to Fabian Hoffman for taking us through how Russia's nuclear blackmail

00:35:36: is shaping German foreign policy right now and the various dimensions of that.

00:35:41: Let's go on to our next guest to take us through how this fits into a wider global context,

00:35:45: among other topics we'll be talking about today.

00:35:48: First up, we have my fellow Canadian, Kerry Buck.

00:35:52: Her long career in diplomatic service includes a post as Canada's ambassador and permanent

00:35:58: representative to NATO.

00:35:59: And she is now a senior fellow at Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International

00:36:04: Affairs.

00:36:05: With her today, we have William Albert, former director of strategy, technology and arms

00:36:11: control at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, with whom he is still associated

00:36:17: and a great expert on all things nuclear.

00:36:20: Welcome to the show.

00:36:22: Let's start with you, William, quickly.

00:36:24: You have argued before that you don't think Putin is likely to use nuclear weapons in

00:36:30: this conflict.

00:36:32: Why do you think that is?

00:36:34: To put simply, when you think about whether or not Russia is going to use nuclear weapons,

00:36:38: you have to think, what's the theory behind it?

00:36:41: What are they trying to get out of that nuclear use?

00:36:44: I think probably before the conflict, Vladimir Putin himself may have had some different

00:36:51: ideas about how useful nuclear blackmail and nuclear coercion would be in the conflict.

00:36:57: And throughout the conflict, you've heard him use ratchet up and ratchet down nuclear

00:37:02: threats in order to try to influence NATO policy.

00:37:06: But in terms of Russian doctrine itself, from my understanding, from my studies, I would

00:37:12: say that Russia uses nuclear weapons in order to try to control escalation within the crisis.

00:37:18: So for instance, in Ukraine, Russia's number one priority for its nuclear deterrent is to

00:37:23: prevent direct intervention from the United States or from U.S. allies.

00:37:28: They don't want to fight us because they would lose and they would lose badly.

00:37:33: So they want to use nuclear deterrence to keep us from engaging directly in combat operations

00:37:38: against Russian forces.

00:37:40: In general, this is very consistent with Russian doctrine.

00:37:42: It's all about how to control escalation to prevent a local war from becoming a regional

00:37:47: war unless Russia wants it to, or to prevent a regional war from becoming a U.S. Russia

00:37:52: war.

00:37:53: So they'll use nuclear deployments, they'll use nuclear threats, they'll use nuclear exercises

00:37:59: in order to try to influence, shape Western reactions and Western policies, Western decisions.

00:38:08: If they thought there was a utility of using these on the battlefield, then they certainly

00:38:12: would.

00:38:13: But you look at the battlefield and where exactly would they use a nuclear strike?

00:38:18: If you're talking about a battlefield nuclear weapon, what we used to call tactical nuclear

00:38:22: weapons, you're talking about weapons with an atomic yield of several hundred tons up

00:38:28: to several thousands, maybe tens of thousands of tons.

00:38:33: These are really good for destroying massed forces in very concentrated areas.

00:38:37: And that's not really how Ukraine has been operating throughout the conflict.

00:38:40: They've been operating with hit-and-run tactics, getting very close to the Russian forces,

00:38:46: but not really mass tank battles in the way that you would imagine large-scale nuclear

00:38:51: strikes would work.

00:38:53: In addition, you would use nuclear strikes and Russia conceives of nuclear strikes as

00:38:56: demoralizing the foe.

00:38:58: And you've seen this mirrored in how they use conventional forces.

00:39:01: They want to kill lots of civilians in order to try to knock Ukraine out of the war.

00:39:05: Would going to the nuclear level help them in that regard?

00:39:08: I would argue that if they were to use nuclear weapons to try to demoralize Ukraine, it would

00:39:13: fail utterly.

00:39:14: It would actually galvanize Ukraine massively.

00:39:18: And you've got that other element.

00:39:19: If they were to go to the nuclear level, they would risk the direct involvement of the United

00:39:24: States.

00:39:25: That's where I think U.S. private signaling to Russia has been very effective.

00:39:29: Now, we don't have direct evidence of this, but we have lots and lots of circumstantial

00:39:33: evidence that from the earliest stages of the conflict, the U.S. has communicated directly

00:39:37: to Russia at the level of the National Security Advisor and other levels that if they were

00:39:41: to use nuclear weapons, that would be the risk that the U.S. would come in.

00:39:45: In fact, the U.S. would unleash devastating conventional strikes on Russian forces in order

00:39:50: to deny them a victory on the battlefield.

00:39:53: And I think Putin takes that very seriously.

00:39:56: And there's one other thing to talk about in terms of Russia and the use of nuclear weapons

00:39:59: in Ukraine.

00:40:00: And that's how the rest of the world would react.

00:40:02: And I'm not talking about in terms of moral reaction, because Putin certainly doesn't

00:40:06: care at all how people react morally to what he does.

00:40:09: Obviously, he's willing to kill civilians in huge numbers to allow his forces to commit

00:40:14: horrible atrocities.

00:40:15: What he does care about is whether China and India and other countries will continue to

00:40:19: trade with him and allow him to avoid the pressure of sanctions.

00:40:24: And in that regard, I think President Xi Jinping and Modi in India have both made it absolutely

00:40:30: clear that they do not want to see nuclear weapons involved in this conflict.

00:40:34: And Xi has said so directly several times, including very recently.

00:40:38: So I think there is that worry in the back of Putin's head that, number one, the U.S.

00:40:42: would get involved.

00:40:43: And number two, if he loses trade from China and India and other countries in the non-aligned

00:40:48: movement in the third world and the global south that he has been relying upon so far

00:40:53: in order to relieve the pressure from sanctions, that truly could create the conditions for

00:40:59: not only a Russian defeat in the battlefield, but a broader blow to the Russian economy

00:41:04: that might see him losing power.

00:41:05: I agree with William.

00:41:06: When you saw a heightening of Putin's nuclear rhetoric around October 2022, at the same

00:41:14: time you saw a flurry of activity with Western diplomats, but primarily Western diplomats

00:41:19: from the nuclear powers heading off to Beijing and heading off to India as well.

00:41:25: And that was no happenstance or coincidence.

00:41:28: Pressure was definitely being applied on those states, so they would then apply collateral

00:41:32: pressure on Russia.

00:41:33: And I also agree with William that it's clear, not clear that tactical nuclear weapons would

00:41:39: give Russia a battlefield advantage.

00:41:41: You know, conventional weapons are more precise.

00:41:43: They can achieve most of the same military effects on a battlefield.

00:41:47: They don't carry the same geopolitical risks.

00:41:50: But the threat of use, which we've seen continuously since well before the full-on invasion two

00:41:55: years ago, the threat of use, particularly against civilian or political targets, does

00:41:59: give Putin a psychological advantage, aimed at either convincing Ukraine to stand down

00:42:04: or the West to limit its support.

00:42:06: But here's where I differ.

00:42:08: The problem is that's not working, right?

00:42:10: And deterrence rests on rational calculation.

00:42:13: Before the war, most Western analysts, myself included, thought Putin wouldn't launch the

00:42:18: largest ground war in Europe since World War II because it wasn't in Russia's interest.

00:42:23: And yet, every time we think, "No, he wouldn't, Woody."

00:42:26: Well, yes, he would.

00:42:28: And I think that the existential threat that appears to be driving Putin right now is not

00:42:32: to the Russian state, but to his own hold on power.

00:42:35: So it depends how the war progresses.

00:42:38: The odds are slim of Putin remaining in place in the event of a total collapse of Russian

00:42:42: conventional forces in Ukraine, or even worse for Putin if Ukraine were to take back Crimea.

00:42:48: Putin's become, over the years, a personalist dictator, and they will almost always choose

00:42:52: rash military moves over Putin's if there's a perceived threat to their own regime, right?

00:42:57: So, well, I agree with William that the chances of him actually using nuclear weapons in the

00:43:04: conflict are slim.

00:43:06: It would be very unwise, I think, for the West to discount that possibility.

00:43:13: So it's a very fine line between not self-deterring, but on the other hand, not risking World

00:43:17: War III.

00:43:18: Right.

00:43:19: Let me follow up on that.

00:43:20: William, I'm coming to you with that, because what you mentioned before about the US private

00:43:24: signaling being extremely effective, plus the other signaling that's been done by other

00:43:30: players in the game, by India, by China, et cetera, that would seem to suggest that the

00:43:35: German fear that is so manifest of nuclear use is unjustified.

00:43:40: But listening to what Kerry just said, there's another element to it as well.

00:43:44: How would you weigh those things?

00:43:46: Directly apropos to what Kerry was saying, there is an actual debate that is occurring

00:43:51: in Russia, in public, in Russian only, between a fellow by the name of Sergei Karaganov,

00:43:57: a former noted arms controller named Dmitry Trenin, and Vladimir Putin himself, which

00:44:04: actually surfaced at the Valdai Club in October.

00:44:07: We're basically Karaganov has been writing papers since June of last year saying that

00:44:13: nuclear deterrence, quote unquote, is not working with the West, and therefore we need to reassert

00:44:18: deterrence potentially by striking at a NATO ally that is supporting Ukraine in order to

00:44:24: reestablish deterrence.

00:44:25: Now, of course, this is a different use of the word deterrence than we use in the West.

00:44:29: This is nuclear coercion, pure and simple.

00:44:31: But yes, being a nuclear power does not mean you get everything that you want.

00:44:36: And watching Russians have this argument in real time about why don't we get everything

00:44:40: that we want?

00:44:41: That's really weird.

00:44:42: We have nuclear weapons, and they know that we might use them.

00:44:44: So why don't they just give us what we want?

00:44:47: I think this speaks to 30 years of German policy and of Western policy in general of either

00:44:54: not caring about Russia or basically shrugging and saying, oh, it's fine.

00:44:58: Oh, you can't remove your forces from Moldova because they're old ladies throwing themselves

00:45:02: in front of ammunition trains, and you couldn't possibly control that.

00:45:05: Sure, then just keep your forces in Moldova forever.

00:45:08: Who cares?

00:45:09: That kind of attitude.

00:45:10: You invaded Georgia.

00:45:11: Well, let's have a reset.

00:45:14: Let's see if that works.

00:45:15: You know what I mean?

00:45:16: I think we've kept going back and back and back and rewarding Russian bad behavior.

00:45:20: And so they really, I think we've helped teach them that in the face of threats, in the face

00:45:25: of hard military action, the West will back down.

00:45:28: And I think February 2022 came as a huge shock to the Russian system, the way that the West

00:45:32: has reacted, the way that the West has held together.

00:45:36: We might complain about how we haven't done enough, but I think it has deeply shocked the

00:45:41: Russian system and a lot of assumptions they have about Western cohesion.

00:45:45: So I would say that our past behavior in terms of backing down or not taking Russia seriously,

00:45:52: not standing up to their threats, not standing up to their actions has taught Russia that

00:45:56: they can get away with things.

00:45:57: And so now they're having this argument about, okay, how do we reinstill that fear in the

00:46:02: back down. It reminds me a lot of President Richard Nixon in 1970, privately, he had these

00:46:08: conversations with his security team, including Kissinger, that he needed to reinstall fear

00:46:13: in the Soviets and the North Vietnamese. And they called this madman theory, where he would

00:46:17: just say nutty things. Strategic air command actually had the largest scramble of nuclear

00:46:22: forces they ever had in the Cold War was just to try to intimidate the Soviets and North

00:46:27: Vietnamese to pressure North Vietnam into negotiations. And it didn't work. So I'm a little surprised

00:46:32: Putin isn't a little bit more aware that nuclear weapon armed states don't get what they want,

00:46:37: that the asymmetry of interests and the asymmetry of risks of introducing nuclear weapons is

00:46:42: such that it's just not credible. And so that's why Karagana is suggesting why don't we why

00:46:47: don't we let one off and just see what happens. It's a crazy idea for all the reasons that

00:46:51: we just discussed. But as Kerry pointed out, this is an idea that they are exploring with

00:46:56: they're toying with this right now, this latest tactical nuclear weapons exercise, non strategic

00:47:01: weapons exercise that Russia is about to carry out. We've seen a Belarusian nuclear capable

00:47:08: forces moving in this exercise. This is all designed to try to reinstall that fear. And

00:47:13: so how much will they miscalculate here? Will they go too far? Will they think that the use

00:47:18: of a nuclear weapon, even a demonstration use in order to reinstall fear in the West

00:47:22: is necessary to achieve their strategic policy outcomes? That's a big question. And so I

00:47:27: think Kerry is right, you can't completely discount that they'll go too far because they

00:47:31: have gone too far before. Very interesting point. And yes, the madman point was exactly

00:47:35: where I was going to go actually with this because indeed, Kerry, you mentioned this,

00:47:38: the whole deterrence scenario depends on rational calculation, but on both sides and Russia

00:47:44: was expecting us to follow the path that William had outlined. And then suddenly we became

00:47:49: unpredictable actually in this circumstance. Our actions in relation to Ukraine became

00:47:54: unpredictable to the Russian calculus, which has thrown them back on their heels a little

00:47:57: bit. But I wanted to ask you both because you both worked at NATO for a long time in

00:48:03: different capacities. You mentioned in the very beginning, William, that the use of

00:48:07: Russian or the Russian use of nuclear language, nuclear signaling, etc. is part of escalation

00:48:12: management and part of managing the conflict, part of controlling the conflict in a way.

00:48:17: How are we countering that? And how actually, because there's more than more than one player

00:48:20: involved here, what are the tools at our disposal to actually have our influence and our say

00:48:25: on that? I think we've got two conundrums in the West. I think that Russia is more able

00:48:31: to using the information space on nuclear threats than we are. And we need to think through

00:48:38: strategically how we can send tougher messages, I think, more credible, tougher messages.

00:48:44: But the conundrum is that managing it in many allied states like Canada and Germany with

00:48:48: our own populations is going to be extremely difficult. And I would argue more difficult

00:48:53: than it was in the Cold War, where the possibility of nuclear attack was more present in the

00:48:57: minds of our citizenry than it is now. The second conundrum for the West, and I'm not

00:49:02: answering your question, unfortunately, is the fraying of the nuclear taboo and language

00:49:07: around nuclear taboo. So there's been an evolution over the last few years that's quite alarming.

00:49:15: And it wasn't just Vladimir Putin when he threatened the world with consequences such

00:49:19: as you've never seen in your entire history. He wasn't the first one to have loose talk

00:49:24: around nuclear. I mean, Putin was mirroring language used by President Trump in 2017 when

00:49:30: he threatened North Korea with fire and fury like the world has never seen. And so we've

00:49:35: had a gradual fraying of that nuclear taboo that has been in place, I would argue, since

00:49:42: just after the Cuban Missile Crisis when leaders on both sides started to understand that nuclear

00:49:48: war can't be won, should never be fought, and maybe we need to be a little more careful.

00:49:54: So if we do escalate our language on countermeasures in response to Russian nuclear use, what we're

00:50:02: doing is more damage to that nuclear taboo. So in a conundrum on both of those fronts,

00:50:08: I don't know the way forward. I mean, my gut is that we need stronger nuclear messaging,

00:50:13: but we have to understand the impact on our own citizenry and on the nuclear taboo. It's

00:50:17: a dangerous, dangerous space we're in.

00:50:19: Which raises another one of these interesting paradoxes that are often struggled to be dealt

00:50:23: with in the public and political realm. As you rightly said, we have to, on the one hand,

00:50:27: signal that we are credibly willing to use nuclear weapons in order to have effective

00:50:31: deterrence. We have to say that there. But then there's this nuclear taboo because we

00:50:35: all know how absolutely awful this would be. And the role of the population in that, as

00:50:39: you mentioned during the Cold War, was also extremely uncertain. And this was the worries

00:50:43: about actually being able to signal properly as well as to deploy weapons in Europe during

00:50:47: the Euro-Message Crisis. The public opinion question on that was absolutely crucial.

00:50:52: I do think also, Ben, that that does speak to the need for leadership and strategic communication,

00:50:58: which for example, Olaf Scholz in particular has not demonstrated. I mean, we've just spoken

00:51:03: with Fabian Hoffman about how every time the nuclear issue comes up, it becomes very, very,

00:51:10: very clear where Olaf Scholz's red lines are, including in terms of conventional support

00:51:16: for Ukraine. The message really is all Vladimir Putin has to do is wave his nukes around and

00:51:21: Olaf Scholz will back down. That has happened again and again and again. So let me ask,

00:51:27: first of all, what is necessary in terms of having better strategic communication in the

00:51:31: West about what this all means? How can we send the message that you can't just wave

00:51:36: your nukes around and not expect a response from us?

00:51:40: Well, I don't think it's working. And even with Germany, I think you guys maintained

00:51:44: your policy on nuclear sharing. So, you know, I would argue that Grosso Motto across the

00:51:52: alliance that that nuclear saber rattling is not working. The thing I worry about is

00:51:59: the fraying of Western resolve and its support for Ukraine due to a number of factors. A

00:52:05: small bit would be the nuclear saber rattling, maybe, but it's just hard to maintain that

00:52:10: unity of purpose. And my fear is that Putin will seek to exploit that fraying of Western

00:52:16: resolve and Western unity around support for Ukraine in a way that goes well beyond the

00:52:24: nuclear question, but I think would be disastrous for NATO, disastrous for the West, the non-geographic

00:52:30: West.

00:52:31: And when Aaron mentioned that point about Olaf Scholz's strategic communication not

00:52:35: being all that it could be, I did see you nodding and smiling in a knowing fashion, having

00:52:40: followed the German scene closely now for a few years. How would you go about managing

00:52:46: Germany's strategic communication if that were up to you? If you were the Chancellor's

00:52:49: senior advisor and had it here, what would you be saying and signaling?

00:52:53: I mean, first, you'd have to go back to the beginning. And the thing that has stunned

00:52:57: me about living in Germany is they seem to have absolutely no memory of West Germany's

00:53:02: role in the Cold War as being a major military power, especially post-1955, and literally

00:53:10: making the unification of Germany the world's problem, that this was going to be something

00:53:16: if it didn't happen on the terms that West Germany liked, that the world might end. And

00:53:21: that was a difficult time, but that was okay. And we came out with an incredibly positive

00:53:27: outcome not only for Germany, but for all of Eastern Europe and all of the territories

00:53:31: that the Soviet Union was occupying. So I take what Kerry says very, very seriously.

00:53:36: We need to be careful in terms of nuclear rhetoric, but at the same time, we need to

00:53:40: be comfortable with talking about what we would actually do with our policies, with

00:53:44: our ideas. When I showed up at NATO in 2012, the idea was we were going to get rid of everything

00:53:49: unilaterally and everything was going to be fine and peace was going to break out and NATO

00:53:52: was going to wrap up. And obviously, that was already misreading the tea leaves from

00:53:57: 2008 from the Georgian invasion and 2003, 2004. So there was a fundamental misunderstanding

00:54:05: and Germany just couldn't wait to get back to sleep. And then 2014 happened. And again,

00:54:11: Germany just couldn't wait to go back to sleep. It's really been remarkable that 2022

00:54:15: had to occur before Germany would wake up. And as we all know, the German intelligence,

00:54:21: the life of intelligence was in Kiev when the invasion occurred, had no idea it was

00:54:25: going to happen, had to run for it. Germany's almost willful blind spot has been an issue

00:54:31: for a long time. And I still feel fear, even with the Saitan Venda, that Germany might

00:54:36: go back to sleep. So Germany has to get better at, number one, talking about the very important

00:54:41: role it played in the Cold War, not just at resolving it, but in actually being the center

00:54:46: of that conflict. And they have to get better at talking about what NATO would do in terms

00:54:52: of deterrence now. I mean, we have these very vague terms we talk about, introduction of

00:54:56: nuclear weapons would fundamentally alter the nature of the conflict, blah, blah, blah,

00:55:00: blah, blah. What does nuclear sharing mean? What does nuclear burden sharing mean? What

00:55:03: would conflict look like? If Russia were to use nuclear weapons first, wouldn't we want

00:55:08: to restore deterrence and not go to a full exchange? And what does that mean? What does

00:55:12: that look like? During the Cold War, you'd be amazed at how many more people in the

00:55:17: general public were much more versed with very complex warfighting topics and really

00:55:22: understanding what conflict meant. I found a wonderful book in the NATO library written

00:55:27: by a women's council out in Bristol detailing the blow by blow negotiations that were happening

00:55:33: in the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee and what that would mean for the UK's role in

00:55:37: nuclear sharing. And you read this and you forget, these were conversations that people

00:55:41: were having around the kitchen table all the time. So if I were a German leader, what I

00:55:45: would do is I would try to get people used to not loose talk as Kerry pointed out, we

00:55:49: want to maintain the nuclear taboo, but at least to understand the basic topics, to be

00:55:54: comfortable with those basic topics. It is remarkable how much Finland and Sweden, for

00:55:58: instance, have left ahead of Germany in terms of talking about deterrence in terms of talking

00:56:03: about integrating nuclear deterrence into their own planning, willing to say we're joining

00:56:06: NATO, but with no limitations, not like the Danes, the Norwegians, in terms of how we'll

00:56:10: do nuclear sharing, we have no limits. We'll figure it out as we go along. Truly extraordinary.

00:56:15: Can you imagine if Olaf Scholz were saying things like, you know, in the future, what

00:56:18: nuclear sharing will look like for Germany? I can't really say, but it's got to maintain

00:56:22: peace and security and it's got to make the Baltics feel reassured. And let's talk about

00:56:26: what the different options are and let's have a real debate about that. That would be extraordinary,

00:56:30: but that's not what's happening in Germany. And so that's what I think leadership needs

00:56:32: to do. Again, not to normalize the idea of nuclear strikes, you know, for Christmas, but

00:56:38: let's actually talk about what this really means and what essential role that Germany's

00:56:43: role in as a dual capable aircraft nation plays in keeping the alliance secure and how

00:56:49: that role should evolve in the future. And I think if you're having those kinds of discussions

00:56:53: and debates, then when Russia makes a nuclear threat, it is immediately contextualized by

00:56:58: the public that can understand where it's coming from, they can understand where Germany's

00:57:01: deterrence stands at. But if you keep nuclear as a topic, as a taboo, and you're only willing

00:57:07: to talk about disarmament, then anytime Russia makes a direct nuclear threat, it instills

00:57:12: a degree of panic that's, I think, truly unnecessary. And so treating the German public like grown-ups,

00:57:18: having real conversations about this, we've seen policy on Russia shift. I think policy

00:57:22: on nuclear deterrence also needs to shift within Germany. And that's going to require

00:57:26: concerted leadership, a bit of fearlessness, some learning, some humility, all these things

00:57:31: mixed together, which are, as we know, things that politicians don't do very well.

00:57:34: Right. I mean, this points to a number of issues. So the fabulous example you just gave

00:57:39: us of the Bristol Women's Group actually debating this, going through the analysis of this, was

00:57:44: because presumably they understood the stakes that were involved. They understood the very

00:57:47: real meaning for this in their lives, which is something that politicians have tried to

00:57:51: insulate our publics from for far too long. And so the reaction to this kind of talk stops

00:57:56: at total panic or total horror rather than actually going through analysis. And that's

00:58:01: unfortunately the level of political discourse that we see.

00:58:04: If you draw a heat map of how NATO Allies' defense spending has increased since 2014,

00:58:12: but more importantly, since the full-scale attempted invasion in 2022, it's kind of

00:58:18: a no-brainer, but those states closer to the Russian threat have increased their defense

00:58:24: spending exponentially, and those of us farther out have been a lot more reticent. And the

00:58:28: most reticent of all has been Canada, to be frank. And similar to the German population,

00:58:33: we've forgotten what our stance was. We had the second or the third largest Navy coming

00:58:38: out of World War II, Canada did. At the time, 47% of the federal budget was spent on defense.

00:58:45: Now we're down to maybe our plans are maybe to 1.74% of our GDP and with no plan to get

00:58:52: to 2%. So we've got a population here that I would argue is sleepwalking through today's

00:58:59: heightened threat environment. We still assume that our geography protects us, except with

00:59:05: today's threats, geography collapses, not just nuclear. That's kind of always been the case

00:59:10: with nuclear, except in the early years of the Cold War, where you could see the planes

00:59:13: that are going to drop the missiles coming over our Arctic. But a whole range of threat

00:59:17: vectors now, as I said, collapsed geography. And my argument back in Canada has been we

00:59:22: need to have that kind of national awakening of the security threats and increase security

00:59:29: literacy across our citizenry, including on nuclear, revitalize a lot of the expertise

00:59:36: to there's certain niche things that Canada was good at verification, for instance, that

00:59:41: kind of thing. But not just on nuclear across the board of security threats. We're still

00:59:46: sleepwalking over here in the north of North America.

00:59:49: But you've mentioned something earlier on in the show, Kerry, really going into US and

00:59:55: German thinking on this, which is this worry about low probability events, but ones that

01:00:02: would have very high impacts, were that to happen. So for example, loose nukes, if Russia

01:00:08: were to destabilize.

01:00:10: The US has to worry about those things. And in a way, thank God they are. There's still

01:00:16: the backbone of NATO and the backbone of European defense. And they still occupy that kind of

01:00:22: leadership role. But the problem for the rest of us is the unpredictability of US leadership

01:00:30: and where US administration's policy might go. I think that one of the reasons that,

01:00:37: well, there are a number of reasons why Putin announced the last few days that they were

01:00:44: going to exercise tactical nuclear weapons, but also parading their strategic, the R's

01:00:53: intercontinental ballistic missile through the streets of Moscow during the Victory

01:00:58: Day parade, more nuclear threats in his Victory Day parade speech, etc. Why is he doing all

01:01:04: of that now? A big part of it was that unpredictability inside the US about support for Ukraine. And

01:01:11: then when the decision was made to continue US support for Ukraine, when Macron said that

01:01:16: he wouldn't rule out putting French troops inside Ukraine, when the UK gave permission

01:01:22: to Ukraine to use UK donated weapons inside Russia, all of those things were the prompt.

01:01:30: But the backbone of our kind of consistency of our approach to Russia is still the US,

01:01:39: I would argue, and I'm very, very worried about what next on US administration policy.

01:01:45: Not just Trump and his threats to severely damaged NATO, but also where the Republican

01:01:53: Party is sitting in terms of its Russia policy. It's gone in a very weird direction. So I

01:01:59: don't know, again, I don't know what the answer to this is, but for the rest of us, almost

01:02:06: Trump proofing our policy is really, really important. There are different ways of doing

01:02:12: it. But Trump proofing the policy is almost something that people need to be states allies

01:02:18: need to be quietly thinking of, not talking about but quietly preparing for. Well, yes,

01:02:23: indeed. And unfortunately, what we understand that's happening in Berlin is still very much

01:02:26: a wait and see approach by which time we see it will be too late to do enough about it,

01:02:31: we'd argue, but that's been a consistent theme in European preparedness more widely

01:02:35: in the last few years, it must be said. The best time to start was yesterday, the second

01:02:39: best is today, rather than waiting for tomorrow. Now, William, let me come to you on this a

01:02:44: second because Kerry rightly mentioned the US is still the backbone of European deterrence,

01:02:49: both nuclear and conventional. But we're seeing some worrying trends in that regard, too.

01:02:56: After the moment after the Korean War, where the US increased its forces doubled its global

01:03:00: force numbers from one and a half million troops to three million troops between 1949

01:03:06: and 1952, the level of forces didn't drop below two million for the rest of the Cold War.

01:03:10: We saw defense spending up 4% and higher. Now we see a US military with 1.3 million people.

01:03:18: And we also see defense spending of 3.2%, which given inflation in costs of procurement,

01:03:23: a lot of people estimate to be a little under 3%, in fact. These are surely the trends we

01:03:28: need to be thinking about as well. In terms of Trump-proofing, is the US actual global

01:03:33: power projection capability what it needs to be for itself and for its allies?

01:03:37: To be frank, I would say yes. I think there is a tendency to overlie on the US for everything.

01:03:47: And when you go back to the Cold War and you think about West Germany having, I forget

01:03:52: how many, five, six, armored divisions. The British army on the Rhine was massive. I

01:03:57: think other allies need to step up. And let me put that in two ways. Number one, obviously

01:04:01: a lot of allies got rid of their concept of sort of a territorial armed force. You know,

01:04:06: you think about Sweden, got rid of all of their land forces instead only had what do

01:04:11: you call it, out of area operations, niche operators. If you look at countries like Spain

01:04:16: and Portugal and Netherlands, a lot of these countries just cut and cut and cut and cut

01:04:20: and cut. So they need to come back to some kind of defensive baseline where they can

01:04:26: not only field troops to defend their own territory, which they can't, but also in

01:04:30: theater power projection capabilities. So the ability to flow forces all the way through

01:04:35: to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Okay. So that needs to happen. Number two, I am not worried

01:04:41: about US Army Europe. I think even under a Trump administration, he's going to keep forces

01:04:46: in Poland. They'll call it for Trump, whatever. I think there are still those bonds to to

01:04:52: European defense that exists. I don't think it'll center around Germany anymore, which

01:04:56: is sad. But there is something we can do about that. And I'll talk about that again in a

01:05:00: second. But you know what I mean? The Pacific fight is not an army fight. The Pacific fight

01:05:04: for the United States is a Navy and Air Force fight. So actually having heavy forces deployed

01:05:09: in Europe, whenever anyone says, no, we need to keep flexible. That's nonsense. We don't

01:05:13: need them. We're not going to we're not going to use, you know, the big army to back Taiwan

01:05:19: or to fight in the South China Sea. It ain't going to happen. So actually, what the allies

01:05:24: need to do then is to fill in all those capabilities where the US does have to decide whether it's

01:05:28: Pacific or Atlantic. So for instance, airlift, sea lift, ammunition, all those things, allies

01:05:35: can just make for themselves. There's no reason why allies have to rely on the US for everything.

01:05:41: They can actually help the United States future proof the alliance by not forcing the US to

01:05:48: choose which theater to fight in but rather to have those assets in theater. So when the

01:05:52: US says, oh, no, we have to move stuff to Asia, the US, the allies say, sure, go right ahead.

01:05:57: We're good. No, all that stuff we know. ISR air refueling all that we got it. Go go to

01:06:03: Asia. Good, good, good. You know what I mean? A lot of Europeans are thinking, well, we

01:06:06: need to we need to send a boat to the Pacific once every three years because that'll help

01:06:11: with that. No, it won't. It won't help at all. No, you know what? Defend your own territory,

01:06:15: defend Europe. That'll help. Surely Shanghai doesn't have room for so many port calls,

01:06:19: William. The Netherlands, I swear to God, got up at Shangri-La Dialogue and said, we're

01:06:24: going to send one ship to the Asian theater once every two years. And I just thought,

01:06:29: wow, China's just, oh my God, they're going to surrender right now. But Kerry, this has

01:06:33: been a consistent theme of NATO's entire existence, trying to get the Europeans to do what they

01:06:38: need to do. Think of Eisenhower banging his fist on the table in 1951, saying you have

01:06:43: the capabilities. If you don't, you need to generate them and trying to get Europeans

01:06:47: to actually pony up for this. You mentioned Canada's difficulties in that before. Surely,

01:06:51: I mean, the case William just outlined makes a lot of sense to a lot of people. I think

01:06:55: even Elbridge Colby might come on board with some of what was said there. But what is the

01:07:00: stumbling block here? You worked in the political side of NATO. You saw this up close. What

01:07:05: do we need to do to actually get that message over?

01:07:07: Well, I think that Europe actually has woken up. If you look at the incredible spike in

01:07:13: their defense spending, again, it's mostly those states that are closer to the threat.

01:07:18: I think Europe has woken up. But it's going to take a long time to rebuild those capabilities

01:07:23: that were dismantled over the course of a couple of decades, point one. But they get

01:07:28: it. So your example, William, about land in Europe and air and maritime in Indo-Pacific,

01:07:34: is spot on. I remember when we were setting up the first enhanced forward presence in

01:07:40: the Baltics. And one of the big concerns at the time from the US was they didn't want

01:07:45: to be on the hook for all the enablers. So they wouldn't announce their role as framework

01:07:49: nation. Pentagon wouldn't anyway, until all the others had been locked in place, which

01:07:55: made a lot of sense. So I think the theory is there. The second thing, what is Europe

01:08:03: meant to do? So Canada has a bit of a challenge here. Because if Europe is building enough

01:08:13: to secure its own defense, that is absolutely great. And that's in our interest. But the

01:08:20: other challenge is decision making capacity. And if Europe starts to move towards a separate

01:08:27: decision making capacity on European defense, then we get rid of that Euro-Atlantic space

01:08:34: and the transatlantic unity across North America and Europe. And that, from a Canadian perspective,

01:08:42: would leave us in a very weakened position. Either we are ineffective island Canada, fortress

01:08:51: Europe, or we're sitting there as a vassal state of the US. And so for me, I think that

01:08:59: NATO as the decision making body is the way to go because it's in Canada's self-interest.

01:09:04: I also think it's better for Euro-Atlantic peace and security with not a separate autonomous

01:09:11: European decision making capacity inside NATO, or outside NATO even worse, but with

01:09:17: the European kit, the European capacities capabilities built up. I actually think when

01:09:24: NATO responded to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that's how it played out. And

01:09:28: I actually think it was more useful in determining the division of labor between EU and NATO

01:09:35: and the role of European allies inside NATO. So I think Europe's woken up to the need,

01:09:42: but it's just going to take a hell of a long time to rebuild that capacity. I mean, the

01:09:47: defence industrial base isn't there at all. Ukraine's burning through our ammunition

01:09:52: quicker than any of us can produce and hand it over. So we really do have to speed it

01:09:57: up.

01:09:58: We do. And not least in Germany, William, how can Germany get itself back if it indeed

01:10:03: wants to, to the centre of those defence arrangements in Europe, as you mentioned before? And is

01:10:07: that what we should actually be aiming for?

01:10:09: Honestly, I think the way, the trajectory that Germany is on right now in terms of sort

01:10:15: of squandering the site and vendor. Germany has done what it tends to do from time to

01:10:20: time. It raises expectations massively. It then totally fails to fill those obligations.

01:10:28: People from the outside pressure Germany into doing the right thing. They eventually do some

01:10:32: sort of right thing, having lost all of the potential moral gains from making the announcement

01:10:40: in the first place. But let's be clear. If Germany can't deliver on site and vendor,

01:10:45: if Germany cannot deliver on transforming its defence and deterrence relationship with

01:10:50: the Europeans, especially the Eastern Europeans, so that Germany is seen as maybe not the muscle,

01:10:56: but the skeleton that is helping the United States and other allies, the connectivity,

01:11:03: but also some actual real military force to defend Lithuania and to roll in there with

01:11:06: the heavy division with the sea lift capacity to go from Rostock to Kleipeda. If they can't

01:11:13: deliver on their deterrence capabilities to defend Germany number one and number two to

01:11:17: project force within Europe to defend allies, then they're going to lose even more in the

01:11:23: eyes of the allies. They will become even less the centre of gravity of NATO. Right

01:11:28: now that centre of gravity has shifted decisively towards the East, towards Poland and Finland.

01:11:34: Poland impatient with the pace of a lot of the military development projects started

01:11:40: by the EU have instead turned to the South Koreans. Finland completely autonomous. 280,000

01:11:47: troops in crisis, 900,000 total in all that war. The centre of gravity is shifting. In

01:11:55: the Cold War, it was West Germany that was really the centre of gravity. So if Germany

01:11:59: wants to be the centre of the political and military debates, if they really want to be

01:12:04: the powerhouse, then they have to put up and not only put up, but be seen to put up credibly.

01:12:10: So if the Eastern allies are going, you've made some mistakes over the past couple of

01:12:14: years, but we like this. This is good. We can rely on you. You're a reliable partner

01:12:17: for us in the deterrence and defence of the Atlantic area in fulfilling SACCURS, AOR,

01:12:23: ROR wide plans, in fulfilling the regional defence plans, etc. etc. So if Germany wants

01:12:28: to go back to sleep, well, all right, you know, that's the usual. They can do that. The usual

01:12:33: since the end of the Cold War anyway, they can do that. But if they want to be the centre

01:12:37: both politically and militarily, the opportunities open. Schulz, with the second vendor speech,

01:12:43: has opened the door. Now it's a question of delivering and delivering in a way that makes

01:12:47: countries like Poland and Lithuania and Latvia and Estonia say Germany is a reliable security

01:12:51: partner and Finland and they're looking at Germany going like, what's wrong with you

01:12:54: guys? This is not our.

01:12:55: So imagine a NATO if France becomes the centre of political gravity and imagine where that

01:13:01: would drive NATO unity when you have a greater gap between French kind of policy, although

01:13:07: Macron shifted it, French policy on the threat and what to do about it. I could see a NATO

01:13:11: that's much less consensus driven, much harder to achieve consensus if France becomes the

01:13:18: political centre of gravity. Germany, weirdly, Germany makes me feel more comfortable.

01:13:25: That's something we're not used to hearing.

01:13:27: Yeah, moments of blood inside out.

01:13:30: Indeed. Be careful. Never leave the hand of German nurse for fail to fare a funding something

01:13:35: worse.

01:13:36: I'm not saying that my own personal capacity and when France was threatening to withdraw

01:13:42: withdraw from the alliance and when NATO moved from Paris, I know that Canada went out to

01:13:47: try and play a brokering role. So what I just said would never be Canadian government policy

01:13:53: ever.

01:13:54: Very clear on that. You're speaking in your own capacity there, Kerry. Thank you for

01:13:57: clarifying that.

01:13:58: Absolutely.

01:13:59: Aaron.

01:14:00: Yeah, let's talk, though, quickly about the value of nuclear sharing in all of this because

01:14:07: I mean German policy, as you were pointing out, William, there's a lot of wanting for

01:14:14: leadership and then it ends up going to just see what the US is going to do before it does

01:14:21: anything, including on conventional deliveries, as we've discussed because the nuclear dimension

01:14:26: just sits there. What is the value of nuclear sharing and kind of reinforcing our alliance

01:14:32: and at a time like this, keeping in mind, of course, that Germany is one of the countries

01:14:36: that does host American nukes.

01:14:38: Put your feet up a little bit because, all right, no, I'm threatening with history. If

01:14:42: you saw Oppenheimer, actually, one of the things that got Oppenheimer fired, General

01:14:48: Leslie Groves was deeply upset that Oppenheimer as part of this thing called Project Vista,

01:14:53: and US nuclear assets were very scarce, recommended allocating nukes to NATO to stop the Soviet

01:15:01: Army rather than focusing on city busting, big, big, big hydrogen bombs to blow up Soviet

01:15:09: cities because he thought you could beat the Soviets much better by defeating its army

01:15:13: than you could by blowing up cities.

01:15:16: I think that still holds true for today. I think, well, anyway, we get into that debate.

01:15:22: But just to say that nuclear weapons were introduced into Europe for two main purposes,

01:15:26: number one, to stop the Soviet Army in what seemed like an inevitable invasion. And number

01:15:30: two, nuclear sharing arrangements were developed because the US Army could not be everywhere.

01:15:37: So for instance, for nuclear artillery, you either had to have US nuclear artillery units

01:15:41: attached to every single unit up and down the Western border. And as you know, there

01:15:44: was the Dutch sector, there was the Belgian sector, there was the French sector, UK sector,

01:15:48: Canadian sector, or you would give them the capability under wartime conditions to launch

01:15:54: those nuclear weapons. So that was one reason that the other reason is because you want

01:15:59: the NATO allies to actually be involved. You want them to have a say, to have their

01:16:05: fingers on the trigger to be part of the whole nuclear deterrent. Otherwise, it's war happens

01:16:10: in Europe, question mark, question mark, question mark, victory. No, the allies have

01:16:15: to be part of every stage of planning and thinking about the alliance. And this is why,

01:16:20: from the introduction of nuclear weapons into Europe in 1954 up until 62, who was the Canadian

01:16:29: foreign minister and then Prime Minister Pearson, who started the three wise men to try to improve

01:16:34: the political planning and coordination at NATO headquarters, then the Harmel report

01:16:39: really solidifies it. But it's all about how to get the European allies not to be infantile

01:16:45: and saying the Americans will help us, but to say no, we have a say at everything. And

01:16:50: the nuclear planning group established in December 1966 to force the allies to really

01:16:54: think about where are we going to use nuclear weapons when these are going to affect all

01:16:58: of your troops. And so the idea of nuclear sharing is number one, the defense of Europe.

01:17:05: Number two, the idea that all allies are part of the defense of Europe. And number three,

01:17:11: that we have this communication, this sharing of information that would not happen otherwise

01:17:17: of planning. Because even now, with far fewer nuclear weapons in the alliance, if you were

01:17:24: to remove nuclear sharing from the alliance, I can guarantee you that within a couple years,

01:17:30: the NPG will go away, the nuclear planning group, the high level group of the nuclear

01:17:34: planning group will go away. The US will talk less and less to the allies about what their

01:17:38: nuclear plans are. The allies will feel completely divorced from this nuclear planning. And it

01:17:43: will be something that the US does, rather than something that the NATO alliance does.

01:17:48: That's why I always tell my American colleagues who are like, well, maybe we can reduce US

01:17:52: DC and Europe. It's like, no, no, Europeans have to be part of this. They have to have

01:17:57: a say, they have to touch metal, they have to have the moral and military and political

01:18:02: responsibility for the defense of their territory. And that means being part of nuclear sharing.

01:18:08: We all are part of this together. It is core to the alliance. I think it was a great innovation

01:18:13: in 54. I think the nuclear planning group in '66 was essential. The high level group

01:18:17: in '77. All these steps have been amazing. And to take that away, again, is to infantilize

01:18:22: Europe and to make the defense of Europe seem like an abstract concept that's handled by

01:18:26: other people. And that can't be the way the future is.

01:18:29: Right. In many ways, William, this is the political level corollary of what we were

01:18:33: talking about before in terms of public debate. You're on the hook for this. You're involved

01:18:37: in this. This concerns you. Therefore, you should know about it and you should care about

01:18:42: it from tip to tail. So you've got to actually be part of that. And Aaron, that gets us back

01:18:47: to the question of the nuclear taboo, doesn't it?

01:18:49: Yeah, it certainly does. And I would say that it does because, I mean, if you have this

01:18:53: buy-in, as you were talking about, William, about into the nuclear arrangements that defend

01:18:59: your own territory, that actually, I would argue, helps to reinforce the nuclear taboo

01:19:05: a bit, maybe at least for yourself. But the nuclear taboo has come in several times during

01:19:11: this episode. So I'd like to ask a question about it. You won't have to look very far,

01:19:17: I should say, to find a Ukrainian who would argue that they should never have given up

01:19:20: their nuclear weapons. Of course, they're referring to the Budapest memorandum where

01:19:25: they did just that after the fall of the USSR in exchange for guarantees on their territorial

01:19:30: integrity, guarantees that Putin obviously violated. But what I sometimes am alarmed

01:19:35: by is that I hear people in other capitals, including in NATO member capitals who say,

01:19:42: "Nuclear weapons are starting to look pretty good right now." So is the war in Ukraine

01:19:47: changing up the incentives for countries to get their own weapons? And if so, where does

01:19:52: that leave us?

01:19:54: I did leave out one other reason why the US does nuclear sharing, and it's actually to

01:19:58: prevent our allies from developing their own nuclear weapons. In 1960, President Kennedy

01:20:04: made the famous speech saying, "I don't want to leave a world where we have 25 nuclear powers."

01:20:11: And the fact that US efforts not only through nuclear sharing, but also designing, drafting,

01:20:18: and negotiating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, have

01:20:22: been amazing at limiting the number of nuclear weapons states on Earth, and that's very important.

01:20:28: So yes, I think the Ukraine conflict has the potential to teach a lot of countries very

01:20:36: interesting lessons on nuclear weapons use. Now, the counterfactual of going back to 1994

01:20:43: and Ukraine keeping its nuclear weapons is nonsense. Ukraine would be a prior state in

01:20:47: the center of Europe. They would make, they would look like North Korea. They would be

01:20:52: shunned by everyone. They would be at a far worse position than they are right now. They

01:20:56: had to get rid of those things. Those were Soviet weapons. The 12th Gumo, the 12th Central,

01:21:01: sorry, the 12th Gumo declared itself for Russia. That was an important part of getting nuclear

01:21:08: weapons out of Belarus. And Ukraine and Kazakhstan nuclear weapons were also on the territory

01:21:15: of Hungary and Poland and East Germany. They were in the Baltics. I mean, we had to get

01:21:19: those out and back to Russian territory. Okay. But leaving that aside, you make the point,

01:21:24: do you need nuclear weapons to defend yourself? Well, I think North Vietnam would say, do

01:21:28: you? Really? Okay. South Korea, do they need nuclear weapons? So far, the answer is no.

01:21:36: They made a run out at once. The US stopped them. But what a lot of these things show me

01:21:42: is that the idea that you had to have nuclear weapons and you'd be immune from attack or

01:21:46: pressure, ask Israel how that's going. There are many times in the world where smaller states

01:21:52: are incentivized to attack larger states and it happens. And the presence or absence of

01:21:56: nuclear weapons is not germane to that debate. And the idea that nuclear weapons are, for

01:22:01: instance, going to transform Iran's security is nonsense. It's not going to help them.

01:22:05: They're still going to be under attack by hybrid warfare from Israel, top to bottom.

01:22:11: These will still come after them below the level of out and out direct invasion. So

01:22:17: we have to dispel some of those illusions. But at the same time, the best way to prevent

01:22:22: proliferation after this war is to make sure that Russia not only loses, but is seen to

01:22:26: lose. Because the way that they have wielded threats throughout this conflict, if they

01:22:31: are seen to profit from that, then might send a really dangerous message and the United

01:22:35: States is going to have to work really hard to then try to reverse that. So really, this

01:22:41: is the quickest and easiest path to show that Ukraine doesn't need nuclear weapons is to

01:22:45: defeat Russia.

01:22:46: By trying to manage escalation, you invite it. Carrie.

01:22:49: Yeah. But as I said before, how we seek to dominate the information space is really,

01:22:54: we the West, is really important. If the West self-deterrs in its support for Ukraine in

01:23:01: response to nuclear saber rattling by Putin, we send the signal that nuclear blackmail

01:23:05: works, not a good signal. If there's Russian use with a very limited Western response, it

01:23:12: would send a message that nuclear use works, which is even worse message. So we have to

01:23:18: help Ukraine win. But we also have to carefully calibrate our messaging about a response

01:23:25: to use and our overall support for Ukraine. And I think it should be more robust, our

01:23:32: messaging and a little more visible, transparent and a lot more with our own citizens to bring

01:23:38: them along with the governments in the way.

01:23:40: Carrie, given all that's been said there, what is NATO to do?

01:23:44: I think that there's more room to further isolate and dissuade, as I said, pretty robust messages

01:23:49: about the consequences being catastrophic if Russia uses a nuclear weapon and include

01:23:56: in that not just public messaging, but also that private diplomacy with China and India

01:24:00: and continue with that because it's not a given. You'll need constant and sustained

01:24:04: diplomacy, including beyond China and India, but also to ensure that the rest of the world

01:24:11: comes along with the West to the extent possible.

01:24:13: Two, there's considerable room for shock and awe sanctions still. Get them ready and communicate

01:24:19: that to Russia as well, including some of the Russian oligarchs who will pay big.

01:24:26: Every watch inside Russia very closely and prepare, watch what they're doing more than

01:24:32: what Putin is saying, especially around nuclear storage sites we've got better eyes on than

01:24:38: we had in 2014. Watch their military exercises closely to see if their radiological defense

01:24:47: forces are, for instance, interacting with other forces. And support those in the region

01:24:53: with radiological nuclear defense equipment, but also hardening our own defenses against

01:24:58: CBRN, including DCA bases, airports, seaports. But here's the big one. I think part of the

01:25:05: calculus from Russia is the slowness of NATO and Western decision making. And so there

01:25:10: are processes and technologies that we can do inside NATO, the North Atlantic Council,

01:25:16: you know, to speed up NATO decision making. Some of it's digital, cloud computing, low

01:25:21: Earth orbit satellites, but also analog, more intel sharing. So we take away that advantage

01:25:29: of Russia relying on the slower decision making of democracies. And then, as I said earlier,

01:25:35: just understand that broader strategic perspective about the impact of the West's response to

01:25:40: Putin's threats on the incentive or disincentive for the rest of the world to acquire nuclear

01:25:46: weapons. It's a bigger game that's being played. It's well beyond Ukraine.

01:25:50: Absolutely. And while the road to victory and the road to credible deterrence runs through

01:25:55: Ukraine, it is a road that goes beyond as well. We need to stop letting Russia dictate

01:25:59: the terms here. And in addition to the practical steps that carry very well outlined just then,

01:26:05: we discussed briefly earlier this catastrophic response, this devastating response that the

01:26:09: US could potentially unleash. You often hear skepticism about that expressed around some

01:26:14: of the circles that you and I both move in. Perhaps you could just outline what that might

01:26:18: look like, what would be devastating and catastrophic, and with which capabilities the US would actually

01:26:24: be able to do that.

01:26:25: I mean, if it came down to wanting to punish Russia for a nuclear use in Ukraine, I would

01:26:36: advise the president to absolutely flatten Russian radars and air defenses, everything

01:26:45: from their artillery support and counter battery radars up to the bigger air defense radars.

01:26:53: All their air defense sites, everything in occupied Ukraine, and that includes Crimea.

01:26:57: Sink the Black Sea Fleet if it's in Ukrainian territory. So if they have any submarines

01:27:02: important, Crimea blow them up. And basically provide the degradation of Russian assets

01:27:11: in Ukraine that allows Ukraine significant regional advantages in certain areas. So the

01:27:21: destruction of ammunition depots, local command control structures, etc. In other words, just

01:27:27: one of those blows that basically paves the way for larger Ukrainian victories. And if

01:27:33: you make that clear that that's what you're going to do, and that if Russia escalates

01:27:37: further than Russian territory itself is in play, and that you as the United States and

01:27:44: the NATO Alliance aren't going to take any response off the table. So yes, your initial

01:27:49: response is going to be conventional, but you don't say nuclear is not on the table.

01:27:53: You say everything's on the table, but our initial response is going to be devastating,

01:27:57: conventional, and proportionate to what you did. It's going to be about making you lose

01:28:02: in Ukraine. So we're not going to strike Belgorod, but we are going to make sure that every

01:28:09: single Russian soldier in Ukraine cannot rely upon air support, artillery support, command

01:28:15: and control ammunition, etc. So you're talking about jasms, you know, standoff air launch

01:28:22: cruise missiles from US platforms. This is the kind of thing that the US plans on, you

01:28:30: know, the sort of the mass first strike that wipes things out. And if everything is flying

01:28:35: at Ukraine, you can manage the escalation there, you know, don't fire it from, for instance,

01:28:41: over the North Pole across Russian territory, that would be escalatory, but firing it instead

01:28:45: from firing points where the majority of all the missile tracks are going over NATO and

01:28:51: Ukrainian territory. I think that's all you'd have to do. And quite frankly, even the threat

01:28:57: of that even, you know, moving up the capabilities to do that would send a massive deterrence

01:29:01: message. So as Kerry was saying, if you saw the early political warnings, the military

01:29:06: warning signs, if you saw the 12th GUMO moving out from Sergei Posad, if you saw, you know,

01:29:12: nuclear weapons being moved via train or emergency air transport, if you saw the kinds of, you

01:29:19: know, sea Bernie that they would have to put the sea Bernie defense they'd have to put

01:29:21: in place, that you would first of all make the direct communication signal that we will

01:29:28: impose costs that will absolutely defeat the very purpose of what you're doing and ensure

01:29:35: Ukrainian victory. And number two, you know, any further use will not be limited to Ukrainian

01:29:41: territory and may not be limited to any individual combat domain. That sends the right deterrence

01:29:48: message and then it's back up to Putin. If he feels like calling that bluff, okay, I

01:29:52: don't think he will. I think ultimately we may not agree with Putin's calculations,

01:29:57: but I do believe he is a rational player within his own value system. And the thing that he

01:30:03: wants the most is continued power and continued strength. And if he is not only loses, but

01:30:10: is seen to lose against a massive strike because of his miscalculation, that would threaten

01:30:16: his power. Whereas, you know, he can on his own terms declare some kind of weird victory

01:30:21: here and say this was what he meant all along. You know, so I think, you know, a massive

01:30:29: what are the South Koreans called deterrence by massive punishment at the conventional

01:30:36: level is exactly what I think would make Russia back down once you see the the science and

01:30:42: signals that Kerry was talking about.

01:30:44: Thank you, William. And thank you, Kerry for outlining to us why we need to get our military

01:30:48: are nuclear and non nuclear elements of our military deterrence, right? And we need to

01:30:52: get it aligned with our political thinking and the way that we had our organizations

01:30:56: actually working and together how we actually communicate between ourselves but also with

01:31:00: our publics to make sure that's a coherent message that sends a signal of strength backed

01:31:05: up by the credible capabilities to deliver that means that we probably won't have to

01:31:10: fight and face that threat and thinking through all of this beyond panic and beyond just the

01:31:14: horror of the potential consequences of what could be business upon us is an essential

01:31:19: part of that. And we hope to be part of that conversation now through this episode and

01:31:23: going forward.

01:31:24: That's all for this episode of Berlin Side Out. Thank you very much to our guests today,

01:31:28: Kerry Buck, Fabian Hoffman and William L Burke. Thank you also to our project assistant

01:31:32: Yulian Stuckler, our technical producer, Hendrik Verne and the DJB team, as well as

01:31:36: a special thanks to Wise Canada Chair Aaron Koenig. Join us as we start wrapping up season

01:31:42: two with our discussion on the pillars of Ukrainian victory and how to achieve them.

01:31:47: For now though, from Berlin, Auf Wiedersehen und Tschüss!

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