25 – We Win, They Lose – TallinnsideOut – Talk of the Town from the Lennart Meri Conference

00:00:00: Welcome to Berlin Side Out, the podcast that takes an expert look at how Germany sees the

00:00:05: world and the world sees Germany with me, Benjamin Tallis.

00:00:09: And me, Aaron Gash-Bernett.

00:00:16: Welcome back to Berlin Side Out.

00:00:17: Well, a very special edition of Berlin Side Out from the Lennart-Mary conference in Tallinn,

00:00:21: the first talk of the town session of Tallinn Side Out.

00:00:24: I'm delighted to be joined here by three people I consider friends as well as colleagues,

00:00:28: Matthew Krenig, Mikhail Baranovsky and Evgenia Garber.

00:00:31: Can you please introduce yourselves to our listeners?

00:00:33: Evgenia.

00:00:34: Hi, Ben.

00:00:35: Thank you for having us today.

00:00:36: I work for the Marshall Center.

00:00:38: Though here I'm representing only my personal opinions, but now I'm based in Germany, so

00:00:44: I can speak both from Germany and from the Ukrainian's perspective.

00:00:47: Excellent.

00:00:48: Thank you.

00:00:49: Mikhail, tell us about yourself.

00:00:50: Well, it's first of all great to be back in Tallinn.

00:00:52: I'm a managing director of GMF East, a German Marshall Fund of the United States.

00:00:57: I'm based in Warsaw.

00:00:58: I'm really taking care of the eastern flank of the Alliance.

00:01:02: Thanks very much.

00:01:03: Matt, our transatlantic guest.

00:01:04: Yes, what's great to be here.

00:01:06: Thanks for having me.

00:01:07: I'm Matt Krenig.

00:01:08: I'm vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for

00:01:11: Strategy and Security.

00:01:13: So I oversee a nonpartisan 40-person team doing global strategy and security.

00:01:19: Also a tenured full professor at Georgetown University.

00:01:21: Super.

00:01:22: Thank you.

00:01:23: Mikhail, let me come to you first.

00:01:24: I was on the opening panel last night here at the Lennart-Merry Conference, which traditionally

00:01:28: acts as the scene setter for the, then the tone setter for the rest of the event.

00:01:32: And you're on that panel together with Prime Minister Kaya Kallas and Commissioner Vera

00:01:36: Yorva, among others.

00:01:37: What were your key messages that you'd like to send to our listeners from that panel,

00:01:41: your key takeaways?

00:01:42: First, let me say that it's always great fun to be on a panel with Prime Minister Kallas

00:01:47: and of course, Commissioner Yorva and president of Iceland, whom I never met before.

00:01:54: So it was a great conversation for folks that haven't seen it.

00:01:57: You're missing out.

00:01:58: Please go and see it, especially again, Prime Minister.

00:02:02: Well, the theme of the discussion was whether Europe is waking up given the war in Ukraine

00:02:09: to European defense, to transatlantic responsibilities that we need to take on growing our European

00:02:17: capabilities.

00:02:18: And I would say the message that I wanted to bring, but I think other speakers brought

00:02:23: as well is even though we have made progress, we are perhaps not waking up at the speed

00:02:28: of relevance.

00:02:30: We are in the second year of the war.

00:02:34: We should be doing much more than we are doing right now when we are looking at our defense

00:02:39: capabilities when we are doing at the relations with industry.

00:02:43: And Russia is going to be able to continue the war for a while.

00:02:47: We have an important election coming up in our most important ally, United States, that

00:02:52: will also put some question mark.

00:02:55: So these were the main themes.

00:02:57: And I think I was bringing as the only think tanker on the panel, the message of glass

00:03:03: still half empty needed to be filled up.

00:03:07: Thanks Mikkel.

00:03:08: I mean, all this talk of Europe waking up, the alarm calls, maybe they've been heated,

00:03:13: maybe Europe is waking up, but we haven't got out of bed yet, have we Matt?

00:03:16: Not quite.

00:03:17: And this morning I was on a panel on a new arms race and my main message, because one

00:03:23: of the other participants was saying, well, arms races are dangerous and destabilizing.

00:03:28: And I said an arms race isn't the worst possible outcome.

00:03:31: The worst possible outcome is that we leave ourselves vulnerable to our adversaries and

00:03:35: we have a deterrence failure.

00:03:37: And so I think we're not where we need to be in terms of NATO's defense capabilities.

00:03:41: And I think the Europeans need to do more, but I also think the United States needs to

00:03:46: do more.

00:03:47: And yeah, and again, I'd rather have an arms race than a deterrence failure.

00:03:53: I thought this was such an important point.

00:03:55: And we should point out that discussion was under the Chatham House rule, which of course

00:03:58: has been no means you can't be quoted, but you can be fired.

00:04:03: But thankfully Matt agreed to speak to us in public about this too.

00:04:06: And I thought the point that you raised saying in essence, talk of arms races might be dangerous,

00:04:11: arms races might be dangerous, but what's a whole lot more dangerous is losing that

00:04:14: arms race if we don't recognize we're in it.

00:04:16: So what do we do in concrete terms to actually get ahead of that game and make sure we're

00:04:20: in pole position?

00:04:21: Well, let me speak to the nuclear piece first, because I think when people think about an

00:04:25: arms race, they often think of the nuclear arms race from the Cold War.

00:04:28: And I was recently appointed by the US Congress to serve on a commission reviewing US strategic

00:04:34: posture and we provided our recommendations to Congress in October.

00:04:38: So bipartisan panel, 12 people, unanimous recommendations.

00:04:43: And essentially we call for the first strategic arms buildup in the United States since the

00:04:47: end of the Cold War to plan to buy new nuclear, more nuclear submarines, more nuclear bombers

00:04:53: to develop and deploy additional non strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and the Indo Pacific

00:04:59: and for the first time for the United States to develop a missile defense system for Russia

00:05:04: and China.

00:05:05: So I think that's what we need to do at the strategic level.

00:05:08: The report didn't get a lot of attention.

00:05:10: Unfortunately, it came out October 12th, just after the October 7th attacks.

00:05:15: So doing what I can to bring attention to this because I think it will be important for

00:05:20: the deterrence of the free world.

00:05:22: 100% well, fear not Matt, now that you're on Berlin's side out, or Tallins side out,

00:05:26: I'm sure the word will rapidly spread.

00:05:28: But Yevgenia, that kind of talk is a world away from what we hear in Germany.

00:05:31: Yes, absolutely.

00:05:32: But that's something I can totally relate to because my argument from the very beginning

00:05:36: has been that probably bilateral escalation is not good, but what is worse is unilateral

00:05:41: escalation.

00:05:42: So when Russia is escalating and the West is trying to de-escalate, that's not going

00:05:47: to work.

00:05:48: And that's what we're seeing now.

00:05:50: So far, it hasn't worked well.

00:05:52: So probably we need to have a new much bolder strategy.

00:05:56: That's exactly why I like the idea of this year's conference.

00:06:00: Let us not despair but act because despite some of the tactical advances in Ukraine

00:06:05: and some of the tactical successes Russia has, we need to act.

00:06:09: We need to take bolder steps and we need to have a very clear-eyed strategy for a long

00:06:14: war.

00:06:15: We do, but it's a delicate balance to strike, isn't it, between waking people up to the

00:06:19: severity of the threats we face, the dangers that we are in without allowing that to become

00:06:23: a council of despair and becoming too doomy.

00:06:26: So we need to actually somehow draw the idea that we can act.

00:06:29: So in concrete terms, and we're going to be talking about this with Elliot Cohen and

00:06:33: with Tim Snyder later on, as well as with Marcus Tarkner and Anna Isabel Xavier, we are

00:06:38: going to be asking them, where do we draw actually that strength to act from?

00:06:43: And where do you think that comes from here, Gennia?

00:06:45: Well, for Ukrainians, that's very easy because we don't have any other option.

00:06:49: We don't have a luxury to lose.

00:06:51: So this national resilience that comes from a realization of the fact that we only have

00:06:55: bad scenarios and worst-case scenarios.

00:06:58: We don't have a luxury of having great scenarios now.

00:07:01: So even though it's going to be tough, we need to fight back.

00:07:04: But for most of our European colleagues, and especially for many societies in the West,

00:07:09: I think it's important to realize what happens if Ukraine fails.

00:07:12: And that's what can bring a very different threat perception if we realize that there

00:07:18: is no struggling Ukraine anymore and then the Russian forces are not necessarily moving

00:07:26: into European or NATO territories, but they increase all type of hybrid attacks that we

00:07:31: can witness now.

00:07:33: They move from disruption to destruction.

00:07:36: That's not going to work for Europe as well.

00:07:37: So that's exactly why we need to wake up to this new reality.

00:07:41: Right.

00:07:42: And Mikhail, something that came up on the first panel yesterday also was the role of

00:07:45: central and east European countries in this.

00:07:48: Because what you've said now, I say that kind of thing in Germany and the federal president

00:07:53: accuses me and people like me of being so-called "Kaliba expert" and "war mongers" and another

00:07:58: phrase, but actually waking up to the danger, getting Germans to realize this is not someone

00:08:02: else's problem.

00:08:03: That's a message that's been coming so strongly from central, eastern Europe for years now.

00:08:08: Why isn't Germany listening and why aren't other countries in Western Europe listening?

00:08:12: Well, I think the needle is moving just again slowly.

00:08:16: And the Evgenia said that Ukraine has no other option.

00:08:20: I actually think that we are kidding ourselves if we think that we have some other option.

00:08:24: I mean, the fact is that if Ukraine was to lose, we would be facing a victorious Russian

00:08:34: army on the borders of NATO.

00:08:37: And we now are seeing that Russia is preparing to challenge NATO over a longer term.

00:08:45: Right.

00:08:46: And central, eastern Europe woke up to this a long time ago.

00:08:51: For us, February 2022 was a terrible confirmation of something that we have seen coming over

00:09:00: a longer term trend.

00:09:03: Now it is, I think, especially responsibility of northern Europe, central, eastern Europe,

00:09:09: leaders like Prime Minister Kala, leaders like Donald Tusk.

00:09:13: One of your favorite prime ministers I heard yesterday.

00:09:15: Yes, she is.

00:09:16: And it is true.

00:09:17: Of course, now I'm a big fan of Donald Tusk as well.

00:09:22: And Radak Shikorsky is another very important voice to really alerting the whole transatlantic

00:09:29: community to what is at stake.

00:09:31: And what is at stake is frankly, we focus here in Tallinn on the European security, but

00:09:36: the point we made also in the opening panel is that Ukraine and the European theater is

00:09:42: just one of the theaters that is already on fire.

00:09:46: The other one is the Middle East that is on fire.

00:09:49: And actually, the next panel after our conversation is about Indo-Pacific.

00:09:54: So we are in the midst of a global confrontation, perhaps global conflict.

00:09:59: And of course, that kind of conflict will impact and is already impacting Germany and

00:10:06: France and Western Europe.

00:10:09: And it's a just question of whether all the societies and all the leaders react proactively.

00:10:17: That's a bit of a misnomer to this.

00:10:20: To this now or whether we wait a little bit longer.

00:10:22: The longer we wait, the higher the price will be.

00:10:25: Right.

00:10:26: Strategic dithering.

00:10:27: Absolutely.

00:10:28: It is raising the cost to all of us here.

00:10:29: Absolutely.

00:10:30: And it's interesting you mentioned Donald Tusk and Radak Shikorsky because since they

00:10:33: came into power, it's been much harder for the German government to ignore what is being

00:10:37: said from Poland because they haven't been able to dismiss the government as right-wing

00:10:42: extremists, nationalists, Russophobes and Germanophobes in equal measure.

00:10:46: You can't do that with Tusk and Shikorsky.

00:10:48: But what we see is Berlin now hiding somewhere else, hiding behind Washington.

00:10:52: So Matt, what's the role of US leadership on this?

00:10:54: Well, I think US leadership is essential for NATO and also for the war in Ukraine.

00:11:00: And I think the Biden administration has been a little bit too cautious when it comes to

00:11:05: the war in Ukraine of providing the weapons systems after they decided not to.

00:11:12: Aircraft, high Mars weapons system after weapon system, they thought it would be too dangerous

00:11:17: and then they decided to provide it.

00:11:19: And even now putting restrictions on the Ukrainians for using weapons against targets in Russia,

00:11:25: which militarily makes no sense.

00:11:27: If Russia has a sanctuary just across the border, it's going to be very difficult, if

00:11:30: not impossible for Ukraine to win the war.

00:11:33: So I'd like to see the United States be more forward-leading when it comes to providing

00:11:38: weapons to Ukraine.

00:11:39: But also on the question of Ukraine in NATO, I think the Biden administration and Germany

00:11:44: have been more cautious on that issue than other alliance members.

00:11:48: Very diplomatically put, Matt.

00:11:49: They've been actively blocking it.

00:11:50: I mean, we know this was the key two in Vilnius and the key two who are still sticking there

00:11:54: now.

00:11:55: And the danger ahead of the Washington summit is that we see unity at any cost and unity

00:11:59: around a lowest common denominator point.

00:12:01: Yes.

00:12:02: And I think they think that last year where expectations were built up for some big statement

00:12:07: about Ukraine in NATO and then were, you know, those expectations were not met.

00:12:12: Ukrainians were disappointed.

00:12:13: So I think they very much want to avoid that this go around.

00:12:16: My understanding is that what they want to talk about is a bridge to NATO and then to

00:12:21: try to-

00:12:22: Not an L-bridge, let's just be clear about that.

00:12:25: Yes.

00:12:26: And, you know, Dan Fried, a colleague of mine has said, well, a bridge is fine, but it needs

00:12:31: to be made of steel.

00:12:32: It needs to be short.

00:12:33: It can't be a bridge to nowhere.

00:12:35: And so I think, you know, what does that bridge look like?

00:12:38: I think will be important.

00:12:40: Absolutely.

00:12:41: I mean, Tomasz Garek Masaryk, it was actually his son, sorry, Jan Masaryk, the Czech politician

00:12:46: from years ago, famously said a bridge is what gets walked over, which is why the Czechs

00:12:50: refuse to be styled as a bridge in international relations.

00:12:53: But here indeed, there seems to be a need for temporary arrangements that can act as

00:12:56: a pathway in not an alternative to NATO membership.

00:12:59: But much like on the case of supplying Ukraine with what it needs, until the US leadership

00:13:04: says to the American people very clearly, this is our war and we've got to win it, I

00:13:08: don't think we're going to get there.

00:13:09: Are we, Evgenia?

00:13:10: Yeah, I think strategic communication is really important.

00:13:13: And that's what we lack now in many European countries, but also in the US, because for

00:13:17: many people, that's still a war which happens somewhere there in Ukraine.

00:13:21: And there is kind of two different types of Russia.

00:13:23: One bad Russia, which is fighting in Ukraine, which is committing war crimes against Ukrainians.

00:13:28: And then there is not that bad Russia with which we can negotiate, which is still acceptable

00:13:33: in many international platforms, in many forms.

00:13:36: And this is not the case, because this is the same Russia in the Indo-Pacific that you mentioned,

00:13:40: because there is in the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation, the same Russia in the

00:13:45: high north together with China, right?

00:13:48: There is another aspect of strategic competition.

00:13:52: And then the same aggressive Russia in Europe, which threatens not only Ukraine, but also

00:13:56: many other European countries.

00:13:58: And those countries which are exposed to this threat or which have experienced Russian

00:14:02: occupation like Estonia, where we have a museum of two occupations in Tallinn, that's

00:14:07: pretty clear.

00:14:08: But for some societies, for some countries which are further away from the front line,

00:14:13: I think it's important for the governments to have this strategic communication to explain

00:14:17: to their own people why this is our common war.

00:14:21: Yeah, absolutely.

00:14:22: And Matt, just coming back to you on this, because you've recently written a book which

00:14:25: is called, "We Win, They Lose, Republican Foreign Policy in the New Cold War."

00:14:30: Right, which is of course taking from a famous quote from Ronald Reagan from before he became

00:14:34: president, when he said, "Complex things can actually be made extremely simple when you

00:14:39: think them through.

00:14:40: And we win, they lose."

00:14:42: Was the very clear message then which led to the grand strategy of peace through strength

00:14:45: combined with quiet diplomacy that actually brought an end to the Cold War?

00:14:49: Is that what we need now?

00:14:50: I think it is, and that's what my co-author and I recommend.

00:14:53: And because I do think we've seen since the war in Ukraine that the world is forming into

00:14:58: blocks, I think we see that the free world is more united than we understood, Finland

00:15:02: and Sweden joining NATO, Indo-Pacific allies doing a lot to help Ukraine.

00:15:07: I think we're also seeing that this axis of revisionist autocracies is more united than

00:15:11: we understood with Xi and Putin just meeting this week, Iran and North Korea providing

00:15:16: weapons to Russia.

00:15:19: And so I think essentially we are in a new Cold War and people say, "Well, it's not

00:15:24: exactly like the old Cold War and that's true, but World War II wasn't exactly like

00:15:28: World War I, but they were still World Wars."

00:15:31: I think it is a Cold War and I think the goal should be for the free world to win.

00:15:35: 100% agree there on that one.

00:15:37: But Mikhail, this is a message again we've been having from clear-eyed leaders like Kaya

00:15:41: from Cabrili's Landsberg.

00:15:43: Marcus Tzarkner and others, and from the Polish leadership as well.

00:15:47: But there seems to be a problem and this comes to something that was mentioned

00:15:51: in the opening panel.

00:15:52: Still, when we think about European leadership, the default is to go to

00:15:55: France and Germany.

00:15:56: And we know, I mean, anyone who's got a sense of liberal purpose in the world

00:16:00: knows that might doesn't make right.

00:16:01: But in Europe, we still seem to think that size makes wise.

00:16:04: Well, how can we actually start learning more from the central eastern European leaders?

00:16:07: Yeah, it's been taking a while, right?

00:16:09: Because Poland and a few other countries have been part of NATO for 25 years.

00:16:14: We've been part of EU for 20.

00:16:16: Yet I think it was President Ilves who pointed out that it was only a central

00:16:22: European in one of the key posts for one and a half.

00:16:26: Yeah, one point five of the possible 20 appointments, I think was the Ilves ratio.

00:16:30: That's right, because it was half of the term of Prime Minister Buzec.

00:16:33: And then the other one was Donald Tusk.

00:16:35: So, and we are now in both NATO and EU ahead of new series of important

00:16:42: appointments.

00:16:43: So the point was very much made that much more should be, well, that basically

00:16:49: central Europeans need to have Northern Europeans need to have seat at the table

00:16:54: of decision makers, decision shapers.

00:16:57: Because I think another theme that we are talking here as well, that is being

00:17:03: recognized in our part of Europe, especially, but also in elements, in parts

00:17:07: of Washington, DC and in Ukraine, certainly is that the current strategy of

00:17:13: as long as it takes or the Berlin version, let not Ukraine lose.

00:17:19: It's not working out.

00:17:21: This is something we absolutely, if we continue on that path, it is terrible

00:17:27: for Ukraine that is bleeding out.

00:17:29: It's a prescription for disaster.

00:17:33: And Washington Summit is one of these moments that we have to change this.

00:17:37: We are doing better as the Alliance in terms of deterrence and defense, although

00:17:41: still a lot to be.

00:17:43: So for some room for improvement, for improvement when it comes to regional

00:17:48: plans, but really sticking to as long as it takes without having the end goal.

00:17:53: And this is where we would need more of a leadership from the United States.

00:17:57: Without that, we are not going to be in a good place.

00:18:00: Right. Because whether it's as whatever, whether it's as long as it takes or whatever

00:18:05: it takes, the it is not spoken.

00:18:06: And that's the we win, they lose part.

00:18:09: So actually connecting these things, I think is extremely important in the

00:18:11: European discourse as well, which should then drive our actions because as the

00:18:15: goal defines the means when you've set the goal off, off you go.

00:18:18: But this seems to require a different model of leadership in Europe as well, not

00:18:22: in terms of the style, but in terms of who's doing it, who's allowed to do it.

00:18:27: Diffuse leadership, where there's some who are really setting the pace in

00:18:30: Central Eastern Europe.

00:18:31: Again, how, Mikhail, you want to come back in on that, but I'd be interested

00:18:34: to hear from all of you, how can others around the world encourage that and stop

00:18:39: us defaulting back to the Franco German motor, which is spluttering, to say the

00:18:42: least? Well, I think there is an alternative to the Franco German motor.

00:18:47: And the best thing that we can get in Europe for the moment is the Weimar

00:18:51: triangle. So Paul and actually coming in and Tusk has performed this role already.

00:18:57: Of bringing the perspective not only of Poland, but of Central Europe, of the

00:19:01: Baltic States. Frankly, we have now great cooperation with the Swedes, with

00:19:06: Finns, so bringing the Northern Eastern perspective as well.

00:19:11: Yeah, this North-Central East European arc is really interesting because the

00:19:14: unspeakable East is put together with the unimpeachable North, which makes it

00:19:18: terribly difficult for a lot of Western Europeans to ignore it.

00:19:20: Oh, it's great. We know this.

00:19:23: Including interesting conversation, maybe over coffee on the rethinking

00:19:28: nuclear sharing, but that's for perhaps another conversation.

00:19:33: So that's the alternative we can have on the table.

00:19:38: The problem, of course, is that we actually need each of the countries to

00:19:42: perform its role. And Germany now is entering this moment of pre-election as

00:19:47: well. So that's where I worry a little bit about the ability of all three

00:19:53: countries to really provide the European leadership that we need.

00:19:58: Evgenia, how do you see that?

00:20:00: Yeah, I think in many ways the center of gravity of NATO's defense and deterrence

00:20:06: has moved eastwards and to the north as well. As you know, we have these

00:20:10: coalitions of capabilities for Ukraine and the Nordic Baltic States have been

00:20:14: doing great. And very often that's also about setting the president and also

00:20:20: about taking a leadership in some decisions which are not necessarily

00:20:24: very easy decisions. So in Ukraine, for example, the first time when we heard

00:20:28: about a possibility for Ukraine to actually have these deep strikes inside

00:20:32: Russia's territory with the Western produced weapons, that came from the

00:20:37: Latvian foreign minister, Baiba Brazhe, and then from the UK Prime Minister

00:20:42: Kemeroon when he was visiting Kiev.

00:20:44: Former Prime Minister, current foreign minister.

00:20:46: Yeah, former, sorry.

00:20:47: Some people would argue that point at the moment.

00:20:49: Yeah, absolutely. Thank you for that. But yeah, that was absolutely crucial for us

00:20:54: to hear and that's how in Ukraine I think these Nordic Baltic UK bridges that

00:21:00: we've been talking about, they become more and more important and that's where

00:21:04: we see the actual leadership coming from many European countries.

00:21:09: Right, and indeed the UK does play a role here. So as well as the Weimar Triangle,

00:21:12: there's another pillar there and Matt, that's always been something Brits like

00:21:15: to talk about, about a special relationship, which might be slightly overdoing it.

00:21:18: It might be slightly one way, but nonetheless, the UK remains an important

00:21:21: player and perhaps a channel through which Washington would like to work.

00:21:24: Yeah, definitely. The British American alliance is so important and the UK

00:21:29: really has been a leader when it comes to the war in Ukraine out front still

00:21:33: and providing long range weapons.

00:21:35: You know, they were willing to provide that before the United States was

00:21:38: willing to provide the attack arms. So I agree with a co-panelist here that

00:21:42: I think the center of gravity in NATO is moving north and east.

00:21:46: And then I think part of the solution to of overcoming some of the German

00:21:51: and French hesitance is American leadership.

00:21:53: I think the Germans are hiding behind the White House and vice versa.

00:21:56: And I think if the United States were more forward leaning, it would be

00:21:59: harder for Germany and France not to not to come along.

00:22:03: Right, absolutely. And of course, one of the classic missions of NATO was to

00:22:06: keep the Americans in. And I think there's a common message around here

00:22:09: that if we are going to keep the Russians out, then we need more of the

00:22:13: America in if also we had to drag the Germans up rather than keep them

00:22:16: down as back in the day.

00:22:17: Now, let's move forward looking to the rest of the conference.

00:22:20: What are you each looking forward to in the sessions to come?

00:22:23: Evgenia?

00:22:24: Well, I look forward, first of all, to convey this message of urgency.

00:22:28: This is really important not only to take about the steps that need to be

00:22:32: taken, but also to convey this message of urgency.

00:22:35: As long as it takes doesn't work anymore, because it took long enough.

00:22:40: And unfortunately, Ukraine is now outmanned and outgun.

00:22:43: So I do look forward to these discussions about what can be done now.

00:22:48: And my second expectation is also not only to focus on what is going on

00:22:52: on the battlefield, but also to talk about geoeconomics, because there are

00:22:56: so many different ways how we can curtail Russia's illegal and malign activities

00:23:01: in maritime trade in shadow fleets in trade in looted Ukrainian grain

00:23:08: sanctions or convention of sanctions, dual use goods, etc.

00:23:11: etc. So my expectation is that we will have this three hundred sixty

00:23:16: degrees approach and also comprehensive strategy of how we can curtail

00:23:22: Russia's war machine.

00:23:24: Right, absolutely.

00:23:25: And we did ask Evgenia to keep that list short as it's a short show today,

00:23:28: but it could have gone on.

00:23:29: There are so many other things we can do and let us not despair, but act.

00:23:33: Well, let's get those options on the table.

00:23:35: Let's act so we don't despair as well.

00:23:37: I think we have to be able to invert that.

00:23:38: Mikhail, for you, what are you looking forward to?

00:23:40: I would say also two things.

00:23:41: One is connecting the dots across the different theaters.

00:23:45: Our adversaries are connecting the dots.

00:23:48: They are cooperating well.

00:23:50: As Matt said, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, we need to do much better than them.

00:23:57: And then what we are doing right now, it's still even in Poland, actually.

00:24:02: We look, for example, to the war in Ukraine as too isolated from the war in Gaza.

00:24:09: I mean, often this gets lost.

00:24:12: So I think that's connecting the dots is clear and setting the strategy

00:24:17: appropriately. That's one thing.

00:24:20: And the second one is there is an upcoming conversation about NATO

00:24:25: and it's titled What do we celebrate in the Washington Summit?

00:24:29: And I'm all about celebration.

00:24:31: I love NATO 75 years. Great.

00:24:33: But of course, it cannot be conversation only about celebration.

00:24:38: And I hope I'm sure that all three of us will push the panelists to say

00:24:42: how NATO does need to change in the short time that we really have

00:24:49: as the threats are coming closer to NATO's direct border.

00:24:53: Of course, the front right now for NATO is in Ukraine,

00:24:56: but the threats are becoming more real both in a hybrid way,

00:25:01: but also slowly in conventional way as well, especially if we take a slightly longer perspective.

00:25:07: So I I hope to be pushing our panelists, including

00:25:11: speakers from the US government on on going beyond the Kumbaya celebration

00:25:18: of the upcoming summit.

00:25:20: Yeah, now's not the time for just a pure celebration.

00:25:22: Yeah, there is. We have to be able to draw strength from our past.

00:25:25: We have to learn the right lessons from it in order to look to the future as well.

00:25:28: And Matt, you've done a lot of work on Cold War, strategic posture and so on.

00:25:32: What would be some of the lessons you would actually draw from that period

00:25:35: that maybe we've forgotten now? Yes.

00:25:36: Well, in on lessons, I'll be speaking tonight on a panel of what are the lessons learned

00:25:41: from the war in Ukraine?

00:25:42: And for me, I think one of them is that major power war is possible.

00:25:46: I was talking to a colleague who worked at NATO, who said that even at NATO,

00:25:50: a military alliance, he thinks that essentially in January 2022,

00:25:54: the sense was that a major war in Europe was impossible.

00:25:57: And now we see that that's not the case.

00:25:59: And of course, Russia is reconstituting it could attack a NATO ally.

00:26:05: China has said that the military option is on the table for taking Taiwan.

00:26:09: And so this posture commission I served on

00:26:12: said that the goal for the United States and its allies needs to be able to deter

00:26:17: and if necessary, defeat China and Russia simultaneously.

00:26:20: And I think we're nowhere near having the capabilities we need to do that.

00:26:24: I think there are three pieces to it.

00:26:26: I think one is relying more on nuclear deterrence like we did during the Cold War.

00:26:30: I think two is that the United States needs to greatly increase its defense spending.

00:26:35: We spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense during the Cold War.

00:26:40: Now we're at 3 percent.

00:26:41: So we could double defense spending and still be, you know, below our Cold War averages.

00:26:46: And then third and finally, Europe does need to do more.

00:26:49: And it's not just the Donald Trump who says that.

00:26:51: I think there is a consensus in Washington and in much of the alliance

00:26:56: that if we're going to get the capabilities we need for the new NATO regional plans

00:27:00: that that the Europeans are going to have to do more.

00:27:02: Absolutely. And that points to I think some other lessons I would draw,

00:27:05: which our listeners might be familiar with from other episodes as well,

00:27:08: that we did spend a lot more on defense in the Cold War.

00:27:10: We did actually get this together.

00:27:11: But it came at a time when we actually had much higher social spending as well,

00:27:15: because we were fighting that war on many fronts.

00:27:17: We had to give our populations credible hope.

00:27:19: We had to give them reason not to despair and show that this was actually in their interest.

00:27:23: And I think you make the case for more defense spending,

00:27:26: well, we need to make it again to our populations, not only to see what winning means,

00:27:30: but that winning is a hold of society theory of victory,

00:27:33: that they actually understand why they have to be part of that.

00:27:35: But tell us, Matt, just quickly, which panels, which other panels are you looking forward to?

00:27:39: And which conversations do you want to have while you're over here in Tallinn?

00:27:42: Well, there are so many terrific people here.

00:27:44: And it's a good couple of days, but I wish we had more time.

00:27:49: So I'm looking forward to several of the conversations.

00:27:53: I guess I am interested in hearing more how the Europeans are thinking

00:27:58: about the end game in Ukraine, as you talked about, because two years ago,

00:28:03: I argued that the goal should be for Ukraine to take back all of its territory to win.

00:28:07: But I'm afraid that we haven't done what's necessary,

00:28:12: that we were too slow providing the weapons, we're still putting restrictions on Ukraine.

00:28:16: And so, you know, is that still possible?

00:28:20: Or if not, then what is the alternative?

00:28:23: And is there some kind of way to wind down the war along the current line of conflict,

00:28:28: create the stability that would allow us to bring the Western part of Ukraine

00:28:32: into NATO and into the EU and then work diplomatically over time to regain the rest?

00:28:38: Again, I'd prefer that we just give them what they need to win.

00:28:41: But if we're not going to do that, then what's what's the plan B?

00:28:44: Well, you'd be glad to know, Matt, we talked to Ben Hodges,

00:28:46: Ivo Daldar, Terry Schultz and Alexander Daniluk about exactly that yesterday.

00:28:51: And listeners, you'll be able to hear that on a future episode of Berlin's Side Out.

00:28:54: What is the military pillar of victory in Ukraine?

00:28:56: What does it look like?

00:28:57: But Yevgenia, perhaps you'd like to respond to that quickly in terms of,

00:29:01: yeah, we all think around this table, we should be giving Ukraine what it needs to win,

00:29:04: but we're not doing it. So where does that leave us?

00:29:06: Yeah, I think we should not only give Ukraine more to win now,

00:29:09: but as you mentioned, we need to think in a long term perspective of what the victory

00:29:15: of Ukraine looks like. And that would be, of course, Ukraine in the European Union and in NATO.

00:29:20: And that would also be a win-win scenario.

00:29:23: So not only Ukraine wins, but also NATO wins, having on board very skilled, very experienced

00:29:29: Ukrainian armed forces.

00:29:31: And after having invested so much in Ukraine's defense and in Ukraine's economy,

00:29:36: reconstruction and recovery, it just makes much more sense to have Ukraine on board rather

00:29:41: than to leave it in a kind of a buffer gray zone for very vulnerable for further Russian attacks.

00:29:47: So my message is very clear, make defense spending great again.

00:29:52: And that's, I think, here.

00:29:54: Message to our friends in Washington there and one that Matt would hardly endorse, I'm quite sure.

00:29:59: But this is right, Mikhail. I mean, this is the geopolitical opportunity of a generation for Europe.

00:30:03: Well, it is. Well, the stakes are very high, because, you know, as we are sitting here in Tallinn,

00:30:10: the first part of the sentence of the motto is, let us not despair, right?

00:30:15: So it opportunity is there.

00:30:17: But first of all, we are dealing with a real, very real threat.

00:30:21: But yeah, I mean, if we can work this out, we are talking about

00:30:27: enlarging Europe whole and free and at peace at the end of it.

00:30:33: Having our Ukrainian brothers and sisters inside.

00:30:38: And really, that's what it will take in this, what has become a global struggle with authoritarians.

00:30:46: It's just, I think we have a pretty tough decade ahead of us to make sure that we that we can do it militarily and politically.

00:30:54: So, you know, I think the United States Conference will be interesting for the next decade or so, for sure.

00:31:01: They will, because it's a cliche, but when the going gets tough, the tough get going.

00:31:05: And now we've got a show we're tough enough.

00:31:07: Matt, Mikhail, you're getting a thanks so much for joining us on this Tallinn Sideout special edition of Berlin Sideout.

00:31:12: [Music]

00:31:25: [BLANK_AUDIO]